The results of Slovakia’s parliament election on 30 September attracted a wave of dramatic headlines, indicating that the country will “join Putin sympathizers” and destroy EU unity on aid to Ukraine. With the new government now taking shape, is the outlook really that grim?

On 11 October, the leaders of three parties signed a memorandum of understanding, promising to form a new government. A coalition agreement was signed on 16 October, outlining the division of ministerial and state secretary positions. Smer [Direction] will head six ministries plus the prime minister post, while Hlas [Voice] and the Slovak National Party (SNS) will have seven and three ministerial portfolios, respectively.

Although two of the three parties—Smer and Hlas—have “Social Democracy” in their official party name, the memorandum fails to mention social democratic values, aside from a vague promise to raise living standards. Instead of fighting for civil rights and protecting those who face exploitation and discrimination, the new coalition appears to prioritize the values promoted by the third partner—the right-wing SNS.

Despite being a member of the Party of European Socialists (PES), Smer has views that span the left-right spectrum and has never been a traditional social democratic party. A three-time prime minister, party chairman Robert Fico has criticized military aid to Ukraine, called for a relaxing of sanctions against Russia, spoken out against Muslim immigrants and LGBTQ rights, labeled competing politicians as “American servants,” and openly blasted Slovakia’s independent media and non-governmental organizations. In many ways, Fico’s rhetoric is reminiscent of Vladimír Mečiar’s, who led Slovakia to the brink of economic collapse and international isolation while serving as prime minister during the 1990s. 

Although Smer initially came to power in 2006 on an anti-corruption platform, party associates have not escaped accusations of clientelism and abuse of power. The last time he held the post of prime minister, Fico was forced to resign in March 2018 following massive public protests stemming from the murder of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée, Martina Kušnírová. At the time of his death, Kuciak was writing about alleged corruption connected with Smer and links between the Italian mafia and Fico associates. 

Smer’s 2023 electoral success was partly based on a pro-Russian disinformation campaign that has been raging on social media sites, particularly on Facebook. Fico and his associates have eagerly parroted Russian propaganda as a way of winning over disgruntled voters. For example, Fico claimed in late August that the war in Ukraine began when Ukrainian “Nazis and fascists” started murdering Russian citizens in Donbas and Luhansk in 2014.

Hlas, which split from Smer in 2020, was trying to position itself on the democratic left but has apparently been overshadowed by its new partners. At Hlas’s insistence, the memorandum of understanding promises to ensure Slovakia’s foreign policy orientation toward the EU and NATO; however, it adds that this will be done while “fully respecting the sovereignty and national interests of Slovakia and strengthening healthy patriotism.” Despite Smer’s generosity in giving Hlas seven government ministries, Smer took the top foreign policy portfolios—foreign affairs and defense—for itself, in addition to the key positions of finance and justice. Media reports indicate that the new foreign minister will be Juraj Blanár, a loyal Fico ally whose only foreign policy experience came when he served as deputy chairman of the parliamentary foreign relations committee in 2010-12. Hlas did get the interior ministry as well as the deputy prime minister for Eurofunds and the Recovery Plan.

On 12 October, the PES suspended the membership of both Smer and Hlas, which was an associated member of the group. That decision was based on a “clear divergence” from social democratic values and the pending coalition with a “radical-right party.”

Limitations on Smer power

Despite Hlas’s apparent weakness in promoting social democratic values, electoral math will play a role in moderating the emerging government. Smer won just 23.0% of the vote and 42 seats in the 150-member parliament, hardly a decisive victory. Meanwhile, the SNS gained 5.6% and 10 seats. That puts Fico in a far different position from Viktor Orbán, whose Fidesz party won 135 out of 199 seats in Hungary’s April 2022 parliamentary election. A worst-case scenario would have combined Smer-SD and the SNS with the far-right Republika [Republic]; however, that party narrowly failed to pass the 5% threshold needed to enter the parliament, as a radicalization of Fico’s rhetoric led some Republika voters to switch to Smer.

With just 52 seats in the parliament, Smer and SNS will rely on Hlas to secure a parliamentary majority. Led by former Prime Minister Peter Pellegrini, Hlas won 27 seats in the election, enough to give Fico a slim majority of 79 seats. Although some Hlas representatives are content to join Smer in government, others were reportedly more reluctant. A shift toward full-blown Orbánism in actual policy could easily result in a collapse of the next government, especially if Slovakia—like Hungary—is blocked from receiving EU transfers. Another reason for caution relates to the potential for falling public support for Hlas. Indeed, all of Smer’s junior coalition partners in previous governments fared poorly in subsequent elections, and several never recovered.

A Fico-led government will not only have to contend with coalition partners and a much slimmer parliamentary majority than Fidesz enjoys in Hungary. President Zuzana Čaputová will also play a role in taming the government, with the power to veto legislation and reject the names of proposed government ministers. Another limitation on Smer’s power is that Slovak civil society is considerably more robust than in Hungary, where the non-profit sector and independent media have been decimated under the Fidesz leadership.

Does the center-right opposition have a chance?

A strong political opposition presents another obstacle for Fico. Four center-right parties won a combined 71 parliamentary seats in the election, putting them well ahead of Smer-SD and the SNS. These include Progressive Slovakia (PS), which gained 32 seats, OĽANO and Friends with 16 seats, the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) with 12 seats, and Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) with 11 seats. PS leader Michal Šimečka—a committed liberal whose Czech grandfather was a prominent dissident—is emerging as the leader of the opposition, and he recently returned to Bratislava, leaving his post as Vice President of the European Parliament. 

Although the PS courted Hlas as a coalition partner, Pellegrini’s decision to join Fico stems from the experience of the last two center-right governments (from 2010-12 and 2020-23), which were plagued by internal squabbles and policy battles. Both of those governments lost support after the liberal SaS party pulled out, triggering early elections. Despite performing well in the 2019 European Parliament elections, PS did not play a role in the last government, having narrowly failed to make it to the Slovak parliament in 2020.    

A government combining the center-right and Hlas may not currently find much common ground; however, Hlas could eventually decide that it is closer to the center-right than to Fico and the SNS, especially if the new government leads Slovakia away from democratic values and toward international isolation. Forcing the election winner into opposition is not uncommon in Slovakia’s post-communist history, as smaller parties have banded together three times to keep the victor out of office. This happened in 1998 and 2002 to Mečiar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and in 2010 to Smer.

Economic challenges

The fact that Slovakia’s center-right parties performed as well as they did in the election is somewhat surprising, given the economic struggles of recent years associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. The country was highly dependent on imports of Russian natural gas and fuel, and surging prices have hurt many households since the start of the war in February 2022. Eurostat data indicate that as a share of the EU average, Slovakia’s GDP per capita in purchasing power terms slipped to just 68% in 2022, tied with Greece for second-to-last place, with only Bulgaria trailing behind. That figure is down from a high of 79% in 2015, when Slovakia was ahead of most former Communist countries (aside from Czechia and Slovenia), as well as Portugal and Greece.

Slovakia’s economy is heavily dependent on the automotive industry, and policy makers will have to take steps to ensure that the country remains attractive for car manufacturers, especially given the shift toward electric vehicles. Diversification will be crucial. Although the country has the opportunity to take advantage of EU transfers for the shift toward green energy and digitalization, Slovakia has been a laggard in absorbing those funds, presenting a missed opportunity.

Investing in education and human capital development will also be an urgent priority. Although Slovak unemployment rates are higher than elsewhere in the Visegrad region, the country faces skilled labor shortages in certain sectors. Moreover, an ongoing brain drain presents risks for the country’s future development, a problem that is likely to worsen if young Slovaks are concerned about the direction that Fico is taking the country.

Another challenge will be promote more balanced economic growth across regions, a goal that would also benefit from EU funding. Eurostat data from 2021 indicate that while Bratislava’s GDP per capita in purchasing power terms stands well above the EU average (at 149%), the rest of the country is much poorer, with shares of just 51% for Eastern Slovakia, 57% for Central Slovakia, and 63% for Western Slovakia. In contrast, the poorest of neighboring Czechia’s eight regions is 61% of the EU average, while most others (outside Prague) are in the 72-79% range.

Lower living standards and reduced economic opportunities outside of the capital city have clearly fostered resentment and limited potential support for liberal parties. While the PS won the country’s largest cities (Bratislava, Košice), as well as the votes of Slovaks living abroad (which accounted for about 2% of the total), the electoral map indicates that Smer-SD prevailed in most of Slovakia’s 79 districts. Serving in opposition will give the center-right parties time to focus on strengthening regional and local structures and shoring up support in Slovakia’s smaller towns.

Outlook

While many of Fico’s recent statements are alarming, Smer’s pre-election public discourse may differ from actual policy. Given the EU’s importance as a trade partner and source of transfers, Slovakia’s foreign policy is likely to remain broadly pro-European. After all, it was under Fico that the country adopted the euro in January 2009, a move that made Slovakia more integrated with the EU core than its Visegrad neighbors (Poland, Czechia, and Hungary).

There is more uncertainty about NATO and Russia, given that Fico has questioned Slovakia’s willingness to provide arms to Ukraine. Even so, economic interests are likely to prevail, as it is hard to imagine Fico telling the country’s weapons manufacturers—which have seen significant gains since the war began—that they can no longer sell arms to Ukraine, especially since many of these companies are based in smaller towns.

On the domestic front, efforts to fight endemic corruption and tackle disinformation are expected to suffer under a Fico-led government. While Slovakia’s Interior Ministry has been monitoring disinformation and taking steps against it, these efforts may end if the Fico government sees itself as benefiting from the spread of Russian propaganda. On the corruption front, the previous government named former justice and interior minister Daniel Lipšic as Special Prosecutor in December 2020, with the aim of fighting corruption and organized crime. The parliament approved Lipšic’s nomination for a seven-year term in February 2021. Viewing Lipšic as a threat, Fico has said that he wants to replace him as well as police chief Štefan Hamran, a move that would likely stall key corruption investigations, especially when related to associates of the new ruling parties. Although the coalition parties have vowed to reform the criminal justice system, that is understood by critics to mean protecting those allies who have been subject to investigations.

For long-term observers of Slovak politics, the latest election results may have been disappointing, but they were not catastrophic. Fico’s power will be limited by a number of factors, including a slim parliamentary majority, dependence on coalition partners, the strength of civil society and political opposition, as well as the need to ensure continued inflows of EU funds. Given the carrot of EU transfers, Brussels could play an important role in guaranteeing that the next government maintains the spirit of democracy and rule of law, ensuring that Slovakia does not go the way of Hungary. Also notable is the victory of opposition forces in Poland’s 15 October election, a result that is expected to bring Warsaw firmly back on a pro-EU path.  

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To decide about a state’s language, identity and history is part and parcel of sovereignty, as practiced in Europe during the last three centuries and a half. Other polities have no right to intrude, lest conflicts arise. On the other hand, it must be noted that through time a single language may diverge into more, as in the case of Latin that spawned French or Italian. An opposite situation is possible too, when speakers of two languages decide that it is a single one, as in the case of the 1980 Language Union between Belgium’s Flemish and the Netherlands’ Dutch that resulted in the Netherlandish language. Yet, in their vast majority speakers of Macedonian do not see their language as (part of) Bulgarian, and likewise do not claim Bulgarian to be a form of Macedonian. Why can’t then Bulgaria respect its neighbor’s sovereignty?

Many international observers rightly brand the tendencies on display by governments in present-day Hungary or Poland as autocratic.  But almost no one takes note of the fact that in the EU, rule of law is least observed in Bulgaria, and that the Bulgarian Prime Minister of the last decade is part of this problem. On top of that Bulgaria is the poorest EU member state.  And now Bulgaria uses the EU to throw its weight around abroad, this time by intruding on North Macedonia’s sovereignty. It is a case of the tail wagging the dog.

Sofia’s veto is a blatant breach of Article 1 of the Helsinki Final Act (1975). Bulgaria follows Russia, which in 2014 violated multiple provisions of this document by annexing Ukraine’s Crimea. Turning a blind eye to what Sofia’s doing is no option, because it may soon face the EU with yet another cycle of conflict in the Balkans.

In 2017, in return for Sofia’s support for Albania’s efforts to open accession talks with the EU, Tirana agreed to relabel the country’s Slavic-speaking minority of Macedonians as ‘Bulgarians.’ Apart from North Macedonia, Bulgaria is also spoiling for conflict in southern Moldova, where Sofia supports separatist tendencies among the area’s Bulgarian minority. At the same time, back home, the Bulgarian authorities do their best to suppress and alienate Bulgaria’s Turkish minority and Roma. None of this bodes well. In addition, it appears that the Bulgarian government emulates the Kremlin’s neoimperial policy of ‘Russian world’ (Русский мир). While Moscow wants to regain control over all the post-Soviet countries, Bulgaria in its quest for a ‘Bulgarian world’ (Български свят). So far this term pops up only in Bulgarian school textbooks; meanwhile Sofia appears to be seeking to build a continuous Balkan sphere of influence from Albania to Moldova.

Tomasz Kamusella is Reader in Modern History at the University of St Andrews, Scotland, UK. His latest monograph is titled Ethnic Cleansing During the Cold War: The Forgotten 1989 Expulsion of Turks from Communist Bulgaria (2018).

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English available here

Prije nekoliko dana, 20. novembra 2019. godine, oboje smo sjedili u velikoj sali zgrade Parlamenta u Sarajevu. EU je sazvala sastanak da bi se raspravljalo o vladavini prava i sudstvu u BiH. Ipak, posmatraču koji nije upoznat s dnevnim redom bismo oprostili ukoliko bi pomislio da je tema događaja korupcija, s obzirom da je to bila tema koju su učesnici imali na umu tokom većeg dijela petosatnog događaja.

Bilo je nekih lijepih iznenađenja, s obzirom na to kako inače prođu ovakvi događaji. Građani i predstavnici civilnog društva koji su prisustvovali su bili glasni i jasni, dopunjavali su jedni druge i često se međusobno podržavali aplauzom. S iznimkom nekih predstavnika pravosudnih institucija na državnom nivou, kojima je očito bilo neugodno – ili koji su to u potpunosti poricali – svi prisutni u sali su se složili koji su to problemi sudstva u BiH – neučinkovitost, nejednak pristup pravdi i manjak nezavisnosti na svim nivoima. Nažalost, iako je postojalo opće slaganje pri opisivanju problema, nije bilo puno prilika da se analiziraju strukturni razlozi ovih boljki, ili da se pronađu rješenja koja bi mogla pomoći ublažiti ovaj problem.

Zoran je tokom prvog panela postavio pitanje na temu zviždača i njihove zaštite, prisjećajući se slučaja od prije 13 godina. Želimir Rebac, bivši direktor Carinske uprave Federacije BiH je 2006. godine počinio samoubistvo skočivši sa mosta u Mostaru u rijeku Neretvu. Prema njegovim vlastitim riječima, posljednjih godina njegovog života su on i članovi njegove porodice primali eksplicitne prijetnje smrću zbog toga što je podnio brojne izvještaje o poreznim i carinskim prevarama protiv vodećih hrvatskih političara i biznismena u Bosni i Hercegovini, na taj način prekršivši omertu, odnosno prijavljujući „svoje“. Ovaj slučaj je brzo zaboravljen, i ti isti ljudi su još uvijek na čelu Ministarstva finansija i Ministarstva pravde na nivou Federacije BiH i na državnom nivou. (Godinama se funkcije vezane za finansije i pravdu konzistentno dodjeljuju HDZ-u, kao njihov dio „dogovora“ o podjeli moći.) Iako na Zoranovo pitanje nije izravno odgovoreno, pitanje zviždača je ipak stavljeno na dnevni red, i potaklo je nekoliko drugih ljudi da se i sami osvrnu na ovu temu.

Valery nije promaklo to da, dok se ova diskusija odvija, sunce izlazi iznad Washingtona spremno za još jedan dan svjedočenja u sklopu saslušanja za opoziv Predsjednika, do čega je došlo zbog žalbe zviždača. Kroz bujicu svjedočenja, pismenih izjava, otkrića dokumenata i svjedočenja pod zakletvom, ispričana je priča o pritisku američkog Predsjednika na Predsjednika Ukrajine u svrhu lične političke dobiti, a ne u svrhu podrške promišljenim i namjernim zvaničnim američkim vanjskim politikama. Dokazi koji su otkriveni do sada se uveliko i međusobno potvrđuju. Preostaje nam da vidimo koji će biti krajnji nalazi i ishodi. Ali i ovaj istražni proces je pokrenut zbog postojanja mehanizama za zaštitu zviždača koji su namijenjeni specifično omogućavanju javnim službenicima da skrenu pažnju na pitanja s kojima se susreću u sklopu svojih svakodnevnih dužnosti i koji im uzrokuju ozbiljnu zabrinutost.

Najuznemiravajući su pozivi – pretežno od najvatrenijih pristaša Predsjednika Trumpa – da se otkrije ime zviždača. Ovi glasovi tvrde da je jedino fer da se Trump suoči sa osobom koja ga optužuje. U svakom slučaju, zbog prikupljene dokumentacije nije ni potrebno daljnje učešće zviždača. Njemu bi trebalo biti omogućeno da nepokolebano nastavi sa svojim profesionalnim angažmanom, nakon što je koristio svoja prava unutar organizovanog i institucionalnog sistema. Svrha tog sistema je da zaštiti pojedince, istovremeno otvarajući vrata istrazi.

Iako se proces u proceduralnom smislu odvija manje ili više kako je i zamišljeno, preostaje nam da vidimo da li će se ispoštovati zaštita zviždača. Ukoliko to ne bude slučaj, te ukoliko kongresni, partijski ili nezavisni akteri budu željeli otkriti identitet zviždača, u tom slučaju će još jedna američka norma biti degradirana, zajedno sa kritičnim mehanizmima usmjerenim na iskorjenjivanje i kontrolisanje prijestupa, malverzacija, namještanja poslova i očite korupcije u vladinim institucijama.

Sve to je od velike važnosti i za BiH, u općem smislu i u svjetlu nedavne diskusije o vladavini prava koja se održala u očekivanju objavljivanja tzv. Priebeovog izvještaja, koji će vjerovatno biti objavljen do kraja 2019. godine. Namjera ovog izvještaja o stanju pravosudnog sistema u BiH je da skrene pažnju na reforme koje su potrebne ukoliko BiH želi nastaviti sa svojim naporima na ostvarivanju ciljeva vezanih za članstvo u EU. Možemo očekivati – prema prethodnim izvještajima koji se odnose na pravosudni sektor, te prema debati održanoj 20. novembra – da će se veliki dio izvještaja odnositi na korupciju.

Zakon o zaštiti zviždača je na državnom nivou usvojen 2014. godine, te u Republici Srpskoj 2017. godine; sličan zakon je u proceduri usvajanja u Federaciji BiH od 2018. godine, ali još uvijek nije usvojen.

Iako je uspostavljen labav inicijalni okvir za zviždače, još uvijek ima mnogo slabih tačaka i izazova koji se trebaju riješiti. Sva tri zakona imaju mnoga ograničenja u pogledu definisanja, ko, kada i kako može postati zaštićeni zviždač u Bosni i Hercegovini, bilo u javnom ili u privatnom sektoru. Čak i ako su de jure zaštićeni, ko će zaštititi njihove porodice od odmazde? Ko će ih kvalitetno zastupati na sudu? Ko će im pružiti psihološku pomoć koja je tako često potrebna kada se osoba suočava s pritiskom i zastrašivanjima? Ova neodgovorena pitanja objašnjavaju zašto historijat zviždača u Bosni i Hercegovini bilježi jako malo imena ovih najhrabrijih muškaraca i žena. Tragično je da su, od ovih nekoliko, neki ubijeni, neki su počinili samoubistvo ili umrli od oboljenja povezanih sa stresom.

Liberalna demokratija nastavlja biti pod udarom neliberalnih snaga širom svijeta, a to što smo čuli u Sarajevu 20. novembra je još jedan pokazatelj da su izazovi s kojima se susreću građani koji traže odgovornu, participatornu i demokratiju utemeljenu na pravima značajni, ali i zajednički, i da je ojačavanje formalnih i neformalnih mreža zagovaratelja i stručnjaka neophodno da bi se osigurala efikasna implementacija i osnaživanje, s obje strane Atlantika.

Zviždači ne mogu i ne bi trebali biti heroji. Prijavljivanje kršenja zakona, svjedočenje o ratnim zločinima, traženje zaštite javnih dobara i sprečavanje dalje propasti demokratije na lokalnom i globalnom nivou može i treba biti lagan i bezopasan poduhvat.

Valery Perry je viša saradnica pri Vijeću za demokratizaciju politika

Zoran Ivančić je osnivač i predsjednik Centra za zastupanje građanskih interesa (Fondacije CPI), te producent, fikser i aktivist

The post Zviždači ne bi morali biti heroji appeared first on Democratization Policy Council.

Ivan Stefanovski, Eurothink, Skopje

It’s difficult to think of a less sexy basic public service than the postal service, yet in two NATO  countries – one of the founders and the newest member – good, old-fashioned snail mail is at the center of controversy and politics.

The postal services in the United States and North Macedonia provide a reminder of the perils of allowing partisan political agendas to trump independent, professional services free from disruptive party politics.

In the US the postal controversy is linked to the basic continued functioning and solvency of the US Postal Service.

In short, the Trump Administration, supported by the Republican Party, has stated it does not support the provision of emergency aid to the Postal Service, in spite of the funds going to prop up other sectors of the economy. Some attribute this to the long-standing public feud with Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos, as Amazon deliveries depend to a large part on the postal service. Bezos also owns The Washington Post, which Trump regularly claims is “fake news.” Others suggest that torpedoing the postal service would allow Republicans to privatize it, which would be in line with the party’s broader ideological tenets. 

While in and of itself this option should not be discounted as terrible (Germany’s post office is private, for example), it would require a level of regulation needed to ensure service to all American communities, including those in remote locations that would not turn a profit. Such regulation tends to be opposed by Republicans and those seeking to “deconstruct the administrative state.”

This would be a critical issue of domestic policy at any time, but is particularly dire now. It is an election year in the US, and with the pandemic more people than ever are expected to want vote-by-mail options. Republicans who have been opposed to postal voting could use the threat of a full postal shutdown to secure a negotiating advantage. Some might liken this to simple opportunism described by the adage, “never let a good crisis go to waste.” Others might want to pull out Naomi Klein’s study of disaster capitalism.

And this is all also playing out as the US Postal Service awaits the arrival of a new Postmaster General, a top donor to the Trump campaign, who, unlike the outgoing head , does not have any experience in the USPS.

Meanwhile, in North Macedonia, we can see what happens in the advanced stage of political institutional ownership trumping objective, meritocratic public service.

In brief, there was a minor fiasco when North Macedonia issued a new stamp. Normally, when selecting birds or bridges or flowers, this would not be too controversial. However the recent stamp in question, meant to thank former Yugoslav republic Croatia for its support in moving North Macedonia forward in its own EU accession journey, instead introduced a flag-embossed map of the region that is reminiscent of WW2 era Croatian Nazi puppet state territorial ambitions, particularly over Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This outraged several countries in the region. The Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) cried “historical revisionism,” and issued a formal letter of protest claiming that the reference to the fascist Independent Croatian State (NDH) reminds Serbia and its people of the darkest moments of its modern history. The unveiling of the stamp was even more scandalous as it was published on 9 May, when most modern democracies, especially those throughout Europe (including Germany, whose President Frank-Walter Steinmeier called it Germany’s “day of liberation”), mark VE-Day and the defeat of fascism. The fiasco ended when the Macedonian MFA apologized to  Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Croatia; the stamps have been pulled off the market, surely to be a collector’s item.

Whether the release of the stamp was a mistake or a deliberate – if ill-considered – provocation is difficult to say. The very fact that both scenarios seem plausible to citizens is in itself very telling, and says nothing good about North Macedonia’s institutional capacities. The most likely scenario – profound ignorance – reaffirms the conclusion that North Macedonia’s institutions are continuously staffed with incompetent partisan cadres. This is even more evident in institutions led by the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) – the traditional junior partner in almost every coalition government since 2002. This ethnic Albanian party deriving from the former NLA (National Liberation Army) which participated in the 2001 conflict, has constructed and maintained a clientelistic and kleptocratic organization dominated by negative selection in which party loyalty is paramount, and expertise an afterthought (if a factor at all). The lack of any electoral changes that could counter this nearly two-decade monopoly makes the party fundamentally unreformed, and consistently unchallenged.

The other scenario – a deliberate provocation – would seem designed to hurt the ruling social democrats (SDSM), which gained power in 2016 following civic protests against the status quo, toppling an increasingly authoritarian government that had been embroiled in multiple corruption scandals, and which had arrived at an accepted division of spoils with DUI. That such political maneuvering is considered to be not-unreasonable  points to the country’s democratic deficit, and tensions between factions that want a forward-looking Euro-Atlantic future, and those who won’t hesitate to stoke nationalist tensions domestically, or further afield.  

A few lessons are evident amidst this mail madness.

First, public services need to be organized for the public, free from political party agendas and machinations. The North Macedonia case shows what happens when one party “owns” a public service, making it far too easy to give party fealty pride of place over competence in hiring decisions. While in the US, North Macedonia and globally, high-level positions are indeed very often political appointees, this should not absolve those doing the appointing of some sense of commitment to hiring seasoned professionals. Meritocracy matters, and when merit is replaced by patronage-fueled hiring and appointments, public trust suffers as much as quality.

Second, this is a reminder that as governments globally respond to the COVID crisis, there will be endless opportunities for agendas to be pursued, either openly through public discussions on post-COVID social visions, or  non-transparently as governments try to use the current news and information overload to push through measures that they know would not enjoy public support.

That both North Macedonia, which is taking long-awaited steps to move towards membership in the EU in order to fully participate in the trans-Atlantic community of values, and the US, which is experiencing a domestic and global crisis of leadership, are exhibiting symptoms of the result of the politicization of public services, is a reminder that functional and accountable government is never “done,” but requires constant vigilance.

The post Sticky Situations: The Politics of Postage appeared first on Democratization Policy Council.

Valery Perry, viša saradnica, Vijeće za demokratizaciju politika

English version available here.

Još iz perioda prije rata, kada su prvi partijski profiteri stekli svoja bogatstva kroz trgovinu gorivom i prodaju oružja svojim sugrađanima (iz “patriotskih” razloga) i kroz kontrolu snadbijevanja hranom, cigaretama i kafom tokom rata (kada su mnogi današnji tajkuni zaradili svoje prve milione i sada su “cijenjeni” poslovni ljudi – ili političke vođe), što se nastavilo kroz pljačku ostataka bosanske ekonomije nakon rata kroz privatizaciju i “javne” nabavke, postoji stalni tok novca koji hrani lokalnu gangstersku politiku. U osnovi, postoji stalni tok sredstava prikupljenih kroz domaće poreze (porez na dohodak i PDV). Ipak, bilo je i posebno dobrih perioda, kada je kolač veći nego obično. Na primjer, u periodu koji je uslijedio nakon poplava 2014. godine, postojala je prilika da se kontrolira, upravlja i ima pristup velikoj količini novca iz lokalnih i međunarodnih izvora; ili u periodu nakon uvođenja dodatne akcize na gorivo, koja je povećala politički konztrolirano zapošljavanje u javnim poduzećima za izgradnju i upravljanje putevima i doslovno zabetonirala politički motivisan dizajn i izgradnju iznimno skupih dijelova autoputa.

Novi period koji obiluje prilikama da se zloupotrijebe, profitira od njih i preusmjere i javna i inostrana sredstva dolazi velikom brzinom. To je tako očigledno da je čak i Ministar sigurnosti, Fahrudin Radončić, istupio iz Koordinacionog tijela na nivou BiH  za zaštitu i spašavanje koje će biti zaduženo za distribuciju strane pomoći. On je svjestan da država nema uspostavljene nezavisne mehanizme koji bi registrirali, pratili i kontrolisali protok novca i materijalne pomoći, i da bi njegova politička reputacija mogla biti narušena kada se neizbježni slučajevi krađe i profitiranja otkriju i objave.

Državni sektor javnog zdravstva će trebati podršku u borbi protiv širenja COVID-19, i građani Bosne i Hercegovine bi trebali znati da taj novac, na transparentan način i bez političkih utjecaja, odlazi tamo gdje je potreban. To je moguće ukoliko bude postojala volja. Dokaz da međunarodna zajednica može uslovljavati pomoć u ovim okolnostima se upravo desio u Ukrajini, gdje je MMF uskratio 8 milijardi američkih dolara pomoći vezane za koronavirus osim ukoliko Ukrajina ne dozvoli stranim kompanijama da posjeduju poljoprivredno zemljište u toj zemlji. Iako ovo ne bi bio vid uslovljavanja koje bi neki voljeli vidjeti, to je nepobitan dokaz da MMF i drugi donatori, ukoliko to žele, zasigurno mogu uvesti određene obaveze.

Postoji nekoliko kategorija neposredne akcije koja je neophodna u Bosni i Hercegovini, ukoliko postoji iskreni interes za osiguravanje toga da se većina novca – i stranog i domaćeg – potroši na spašavanje života i poslova.

Strana pomoć iz svih izvora zahtijeva objavljivanje, praćenje i nadzor u realnom vremenu, uključujući dotok sredstava i njihovu potrošnju. To bi trebalo uključivati gotovinu i pomoć u naturi. Postojeća rješenja poput Openaid.se ili nekih drugih resursa dostupnih unutar zajednice Partnerstva za otvorenu vlast bi obezbijedila dobar početak. Krađa ili pronevjera novca i roba nije jedini rizik. Donacije će se koristiti u pokroviteljske svrhe, da se poveća popularnost političara i političkih partija, uvijek uz poštovanje polariziranja i linija podjele (npr. turska pomoć SDA; srpska i ruska pomoć SNSD-u; hrvatska pomoć HDZ-u).

Potpuna transparentnost aranžmana i uslova prema javnosti u BiH mora prethoditi uplatama međunarodnih finansijskih institucija (MFI). To mora uključivati dokumente i objašnjenja na lokalnom jeziku sa jasnim planom obaveza otplate. Poslovi Svjetske banke, Evropske banke za obnovu i razvoj (EBOR), Evropske investicijske banke (EIB), i Međunarodnog monetarnog fonda (MMF) sa BiH su transparentni do onog trenutka kada bh. ministarstva, institucije, kompanije ne preuzmu njihovu implementaciju. Ukoliko ih MFI ne natjeraju ugovornim i pravnim putem da budu radikalno i proaktivno transparentni, oni to neće biti. Takvo je bilo iskustvo Fondacije CPI u post hoc istraživanju o sredstvima za sanaciju poplava 2014. godine, uključujući sastanke i korespondenciju sa zvaničnicima entiteta. Zahtjevi za transparentnošću u implementaciji projekata su potpuno ignorisani. Problem je što MFI tretiraju vlade kao klijente s dobrim namjerama. Ipak, građane bi trebalo posmatrati kao krajnje korisnike. Ukoliko to nije jasno do sada – nakon skoro 25 godina iskustva – to nikada ni neće biti slučaj.

Upravljanje javnim finansijama zahtijeva da vlasti na svim nivoima, uključujući i gradske/općinske vlasti, moraju diskutirati o prioritetima, odrediti ih i objaviti, stavljajući očuvanje ljudskog zdravlja i života na prvo mjesto, zatim dostojanstvo građana, njihovu dobrobit i brigu o njima, oživljavajući ekonomiju i održavajući infrastrukturu. Tek nakon takvog javnog i otvorenog procesa, te saslušavanja i prihvaćanja primjedbi akademske zajednice, civilnog društva i nezavisnih stručnjaka, može započeti rebalansiranje budžeta u svjetlu novih prioriteta i novih finansijskih sredstava. Čak i u mirnim vremenima postoje preporuke da Bosna i Hercegovina treba imati nezavisno tijelo za budžetski nadzor. Sada je to potrebno više nego ikad.

Nažalost, posljedice politički motiviranog donošenja odluka već postaju vidljive. Federalna vlada je 3. aprila donijela odluku o raspodjeli federalne pomoći kantonima, gradovima i općinama. Nikakvi kriteriji nisu navedeni. To je dovelo do zapanjenosti među građanima i nižim nivoima vlasti, izazvalo etnički motivirane reakcije i potvrdilo rasprostranjenu pretpostavku da je sistem korumpiran i nepravedan. (HDZ upravlja finansijama na državnom i entitetskom nivou, te se čini da je etničko porijeklo građana u određenom području igralo važnu ulogu u donošenju odluka.) Čak su i zvaničnici državne vlade izrazili nezadovoljstvo ovom odlukom, donešenom bez ikakvih konsultacija i bez ikakvog pojašnjenja.

Jednom mjesečno se treba objavljivati jasan i potpun fiskalni monitor, koji će na jednom mjestu skupljati šta se dešava u pogledu prihoda i rashoda, prognoza i scenarija, dobrih praksi koje je potrebno podijeliti i loših praksi koje je potrebno prekinuti i prevenirati. Jasno informisanje javnosti i jasna komunikacija s javnošću su ključne. Građani bi se trebali moći ulogirati i vidjeti gdje je dostavljen respirator, ili na šta se sada troše sredstva prethodno budžetirana za lokalne škole.

Također bi trebalo razmotriti uvođenje moratorija na novu saobraćajnu infrastrukturu (poput autoputeva, izuzetno skupih tunela, itd) tako da se novac može preusmjeriti na infrastrukturu javnih usluga (škole i obrazovne programe, brigu o djeci, brigu o starima, bolnice, domove zdravlja, itd). Iako se za prvo smatra da je seksi i prominentno, širi socioekonomski utjecaj te infrastrukture je često upitan. S druge strane, postoje dokazi da ovo drugo ulaganje, u radno intenzivne djelatnosti može imati širi pozitivan socioekonomski utjecaj. To bi omogućilo ekonomsko resetiranje nakon COVID-a sa usmjerenjem na čovjeka. Smislen ekonomski paket podrške bi se trebao bazirati na društvenom cenzusu usmjerenom na pomoć preduzećima i prioritetnost u skladu sa očekivanim širim utjecajem i društvenim potrebama. I dok je ova dugoročna ekonomska podrška ključna, neposrednija direktna pomoć radnicima i nezaposlenima bi bila potpuno poseban proces. Ne treba se podrazumijevati da će novac upućen firmama „doteći“ radnicima; to se ne dešava.

Procedure za javne nabavke također zahtijevaju transparentnost u realnom vremenu. Već se desio prvi set narudžbi prema hitnim procedurama. Bit će ih još mnogo. Svi mi razumijemo da čak i u hitnim slučajevima niske cijene ne mogu biti jedini kriterij. Reputacija i solventnost firmi, njihova sposobnost da ispoštuju datume dostave su od ključne važnosti. Ali sada više nego ikad, sve procedure se moraju objaviti online u realnom vremenu na centralnom portalu. Takav portal već postoji (https://www.ejn.gov.ba), ali se ne koristi u potpunosti, jer donosioci odluka imaju malo interesa da obavijeste građane gdje novac odlazi. Proaktivno objavljivanje i diseminacija poziva za javne nabavke između grupa dobavljača, u državi i u regionu, može povećati konkurenciju i smanjiti namještanje cijena i druge eksploatacijske metode i njihove posljedice. Također, trebalo bi promovirati i pomogati zajedničke nabavke, čak ih i zahtijevati u slučajevima gdje bi to imalo jasne ekonomske koristi. Ako svih 13 ministarstava zdravstva kupi milione rukavica, zajedno će ih dobiti po znatno nižoj cijeni nego da svako od njih kupi po milion. (Nažalost, slična razjedinjena procedura nabavke medicinskih potrepština i opreme u SAD pozicionira 50 saveznih država u međusobni konkurentski položaj, i potiče debatu da li bi koordinirane federalne kupovine bile razumnije.) Trebaju postojati posljedice za kriminalno i koruptivno ponašanje, da bi se destimulirala krađa javnog za ličnu dobit.

U konačnici, iako je vlastima potreban interni nadzor kako je ranije opisano, istovremeno postoji kritična potreba i za potpuno osnaženim nezavisnim tijelom za monitoring, da bi se osiguralo postojanje partnera za nadzor. Odgovorni i demokratski sistemi ne mogu priuštiti nedostatak sistema uzajamne provjere. Postoje kvalifikovana i mjerodavna tijela u BiH – oni trebaju imati formalno mjesto za stolom, pristup podacima i mogućnost da objasne ljudima gdje odlaze novac i potrepštine.

Ovo nije konačna lista problema i njihovih mogućih rješenja. Ali ovo jeste početak. Partnerstvo za otvorenu vlast (POV), Globalna inicijativa za fiskalnu transparentnost (GIFT), Svjetska banka i MMF dopunjavaju svoje preporuke na dnevnoj bazi. POV i GIFT pružaju dobre primjere Bosni i Hercegovini.

Doktori i medicinske sestre (oni koji nisu otišli u potrazi za boljim životom i mogućnostima) koji daju sve od sebe da pomognu svojim sugrađanima zaslužuju takav odgovoran nadzor. Ali snalažljivi politički akteri su u potpunosti saglasni da se nastavi sa ustaljenim praksama. Oni su u udobnoj samoizolaciji, i oni znaju da će njihova bogatstva i porodice izvući korist u ovom trenutku velike nedaće za obične građane. Već više od tri decenije oni iskorištavaju krize za ličnu dobit. Došlo je vrijeme za rješenje koje će konačno prekinuti taj destruktivni krug.

The post Après le déluge – Zaštita budžeta da bi se zaštitili životi appeared first on Democratization Policy Council.

Valery Perry, DPC Senior Associate

Bosanski/Hrvatski/Srpski

Ever since pre-war times, when the first party profiteer fortunes were made through the fuel trade and sale of weapons to their fellow citizens (for “patriotic” reasons) and wartime  control of supplies of food, cigarettes and coffee (when many current tycoons made their first millions and now are “respectable” business people – or political leaders), and continuing through the post-war looting of the remains of the Bosnian economy through privatization and “public” procurement, there has been an eternal supply of money to feed local gangster-politics. As a baseline, there is a steady flow of funds from domestic tax collection (employment and VAT). However, there are also particularly good seasons, when the pie is larger than normal. For example, in the period following the 2014 floods, there was the chance to control, direct and access large amounts of money from both local and international sources; or the period after the introduction of an additional excise tax on fuel, which intensified politically controlled employment in public road companies and literally set in concrete the politically motivated design and construction of extremely expensive sections of highway.

A new season of abundance of opportunities to mismanage, profit from and redirect both public and foreign resources is coming rapidly. It is so obvious that even the Minister of Security, Fahrudin Radončić, pulled out from the state BiH level Coordination Body for protection and rescue that will be in charge of distributing foreign aid. He is aware that the state has no standing and independent mechanisms to register, trace and control the flow of money and material aid, and his political reputation could be damaged when inevitable cases of stealing or profiteering will be discovered and published. 

The country’s public health sector will need support in fighting the spread of COVID-19, and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina should know that the money is going to where it is needed, in a transparent and non-political manner. This is possible if there is will. Proof that the international community can apply conditionality in these circumstances just appeared in Ukraine, where the IMF is denying $8 billion USD of coronavirus related assistance unless Ukraine permits foreign companies to acquire ownership over agricultural land in that country. While this may not be the kind of conditionality some would like to see, it is proof positive that when IFIs or other donors want strings attached, they can certainly do it.

There are several categories of immediate actions necessary in Bosnia and Herzegovina, if there is any genuine interest in ensuring that  the majority of the money – both foreign and domestic –  is spent on saving lives and jobs. 

Foreign aid from all sources requires real time publishing, tracking and monitoring, including funds received and spent. This should include cash and aid in-kind. Existing solutions like Openaid.se or some of the resources shared within the Open Government Partnership community provide a good start. Theft and misappropriation of money and goods is not the only risk. Donations will be used for patronage purposes, to strengthen popularity of politicians and parties, always along polarizing and divisive lines (e.g., Turkish aid to the SDA; Serbian and Russian aid to the SNSD; Croatian aid to the HDZ).

Full transparency of arrangements and conditions to the BiH public must precede disbursements from international financial institutions (IFIs). This must include documents and explanations in the local language with a clear plan of repayment obligations.  World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), and International Monetary Fund (IMF) business with BiH is transparent until the point when BiH ministries, institutions, companies assume implementation. If IFI’s do not compel them contractually and legally to be radically and proactively transparent, they will not be. This was CPI’s experience in post hoc research on 2014 flood assistance money, including meetings and correspondence with entity officials. Requests for transparency in project implementation were completely ignored. The problem is that the IFIs treat the governments as good faith clients. However, citizens should be viewed as the ultimate clients. If this is not clear by now – after nearly 25 years of experience – it never will be.

Public finance management requires that governments at all levels, including city/municipal councils, must discuss, set and publish priorities, putting saving human health and lives on top, followed by citizens’ dignity, well-being and care, resuscitating the economy and maintaining infrastructure. Only after such a public and open process, and hearing and accepting input from academia, civil society and independent experts, can budget re-balancing in light of new priorities and new financial means begin. Even in regular times, there are standing recommendations that Bosnia should have an independent budget oversight body. Now it is needed more than ever.

Unfortunately, the consequences of politically-motivated decision making are already emerging. On April 3, the Federation Government published the breakdown of Federation assistance to cantons, cities and municipalities. No criteria were mentioned. It caused consternation among citizens and lower levels of government, provoked ethnically-driven reactions and confirmed broadly held assumptions that the system is corrupt and rigged. (HDZ controls finances at the State and Entity levels, and it appears that the ethnic origin of citizens in a particular region played an important role in decision making.) Even state level government officials expressed dissatisfaction with this decision, which was made without consultation and without any explanation. While hastily repealed amid the outcry, it provides a useful diagnostic tool on the dynamics and instincts of governance and decision-making by the leading parties.

A clear and complete fiscal monitor should be published online once a month, aggregating what is happening in terms of income and expenses, the future prognosis and scenarios, good practices to be shared and bad practices to be stopped and prevented. Clear public information and communications is essential. Citizens should be able to log on and see where the respirator was delivered, or where funds previously budgeted for local schools is now being spent.

There should also be a discussion on a moratorium on new concrete infrastructure (such as  highways, super expensive tunnels, etc.) so money can be shifted to supportive social infrastructure (schools and educational programming, child care, elder care, hospitals, clinics, etc.).  While the former are “sexy” and high profile, their broader socio-economic impact is often mixed. On the other hand there is evidence that the latter human labor intensive investment can have broadly beneficial socio-economic effects.   This would allow for a human-focused post-COVID economic reset. A thoughtful economic support package should be based on a social census targeted at assisting businesses and prioritizing according to the broader anticipated impact and social need. And while this longer term economic support is critical, more immediate direct assistance to workers and the unemployed should be a completely separate process. Money should not be expected to “trickle down;”  it doesn’t happen. 

Public procurement procedures require real time transparency as well.  The first batch of orders under emergency procedures has already happened. There will be many more. We all understand that even in an emergency low prices cannot be the only criteria. The reputation and solvency of firms, and their ability to meet delivery dates are critically important.  But now more than ever, all procedures have to be published online in real-time on a central portal. Such a portal exists (https://www.ejn.gov.ba) but is not fully used, since decision makers have had little interest in letting citizens know where their money is going. Proactive publishing and dissemination of calls for tenders among clusters of suppliers, in the country and in the region, can increase competition and reduce price fixing and other exploitative methods and their consequences. Also,  joint purchasing should be promoted and assisted, and even required when it would provide a clear economic benefit. If all 13 ministries of health are buying a zillion gloves, they will get them much cheaper together rather than buying a million each separately. (Sadly, a similar disjointed process of purchasing medical supplies and equipment in the US is positioning the 50 states in competition with one another, and igniting a debate there on whether coordinated federal purchasing would be more prudent.) There should be consequences for criminal and corrupt behavior, so there is a disincentive to steal from the public pot for private gain.

Finally, while internal government oversight is needed as described above, there is a critical need as well for fully empowered independent watchdog monitoring, to ensure an oversight partner. Accountable and democratic systems cannot work absent checks and balances. There are qualified and competent bodies in BiH – they need to have a formal seat at the table, access to the data and the ability to explain to the people where the money and supplies are going.

This is not an exhaustive list of problems and possible solutions. But it is a start. The Open Government Partnership (OGP), Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency (GIFT), World Bank and IMF are updating their recommendations on a daily basis. OGP and GIFT provide good examples for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The doctors and nurses (those who haven’t left for better lives and opportunities) who are doing their best to help their fellow citizens deserve such responsible oversight. But savvy political actors are perfectly fine with business as usual. They are comfortably self-isolated, and they know that their fortunes and those of their families will benefit in this time of grave hardship for ordinary citizens. Over three decades, they have exploited crisis for personal gain. The time has come for solutions that will finally disrupt this destructive cycle. 

The post Après le déluge – Protecting Budgets to Protect Lives appeared first on Democratization Policy Council.

College of Charleston, Fulbright Scholar

The release in December 2019 of the 2018 PISA data confirmed what anyone who has worked in or researched the education sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) already knows: BiH’s students are lagging significantly behind their international peers. However, when applying a more nuanced analysis that incorporates broader context, the results are more promising than they may seem at first glance.

For the first time in 2018, BiH participated in the OECD-sponsored comparison of academic achievement of 15-year-olds worldwide, and the results were very similar to other previous international comparisons (e.g., TIMSS in 2007), with scores below the international average. FENA NEWS reported these results as follows: “BiH is among 79 countries in the world that participated in the seventh cycle of the PISA survey in 2018, and the results show, among others, that every other 15-year-old has problems with functional literacy when it comes to the three segments the PISA survey covers.” Maja Stojkić, Director of the Agency for Preschool, Primary and Secondary Education, stated “our children are about three years behind OECD’s average. Reading literacy does not mean that someone can read or sign their name, but represents a process of understanding and analysis, and this research showed that more than 50 percent of students do not have basic functional literacy.” Interestingly before the start of PISA data collection in 2018, the Agency for Pre-Primary, Primary and Secondary Education of BiH gleefully announced the process on its website. “The PISA assessment has started in 2000 with the neighboring countries joining the study ever since 2006. Now, finally, Bosnia and Herzegovina has also joined PISA 2018 study, the seventh cycle of the assessment.” However, while participation was viewed positively by those who recognize the value of the country engaging in such international benchmarking exercises, the problems with PISA are well known and have been discussed at length in the literature for decades.

Although the results of this assessment should be alarming to anyone interested in the academic success of children in BiH, several points should be considered. Two issues with PISA are particularly relevant for BiH. First, some have characterized PISA as a Western-biased de facto measure of per capita GDP and, as such, can be used to coerce education in poor countries: “Many academics and educators critique PISA as an economic measurement, not an educational one. The media generally use PISA results to blame and shame school systems. And the way that some politicians, policy-makers and researchers have used PISA is more closely aligned to a political process than an educational one.” This coercive result was immediate once BiH’s 2018 results were announced: “PISA State Coordinator Zaneta Džumhur said that although the results are rather poor, there is room for improvement because unless the new steps and recommendations proposed by PISA are taken, this negative trend would continue”.

Second, PISA as a Western-oriented measure negatively affects BiH’s standing. “Even though PISA use is spreading globally, and is translated into national languages, it is still framed by Western understandings…”. Included among these “Western understandings” is a student-centered pedagogy that heavily focuses on critical thinking and the ability to examine, interpret, and solve problems – modern educational approaches that are more shallowly rooted in BiH and its neighbors in the Western Balkans than in the broader EU neighborhood to which it aspires. While BiH has been in a slow but well-documented shift toward the implementation of student-centered pedagogy and the teaching of critical thinking skills, it still has a long way to go. This situation creates somewhat predictable PISA results and the sum of these factors leaves BiH behind the curve before students even sit for the exam.

Finally, a quick dive into the PISA data, in comparison to 2018 IMF per capita GDP data, reveals that BiH performed commensurately with countries with similar financial resources, and more than held its own with other countries in the Balkans. BiH ranked 62^nd on PISA with a per capita GDP of $13,491. This ranking falls almost perfectly in line with other closely ranked countries:

While there will be outliers (e.g. Romania and Macedonia) the broader data set demonstrates that BiH is by no means an outlier in student achievement when accounting for financial resources. An examination of data from other Balkan countries suggests that BiH is doing well with the same considerations:

A More Nuanced Interpretation of BiH’s PISA Results

For a relatively poor country like BiH, these PISA results are to be expected, yet a closer examination gives both hope and guidance for the education sector. Given the many well-known challenges facing primary and secondary education in BiH, the fact that it is performing on par with—and, in a few cases, surpassing—countries with similar financial resources and histories should be lauded. If any of these well-known challenges can be overcome –  particularly the expensive and needless multiple levels of bureaucracy and administration, the inconsistent commitment to teacher training and professional development, and the continued reliance on rote memorization at the expense of critical thinking and problem solving skills – and BiH is able to put more money and resources into the classroom, where research has repeatedly demonstrated that student achievement is realized, BiH student achievement would be more competitive with similar and even wealthier countries. BiH’s students are holding their own in spite of the sub-standard pedagogical environment; one can imagine the contribution they could make if they received more modern support and educational opportunities.

Those in BiH’s public education sector as well as the donor and international community should look at these results as informative and work toward funding education in BiH at the level of wealthier countries and then ensure that funding ends up in classrooms. This could very well require rationalization of administration, streamlining, resource sharing, good practice exchange throughout BiH and beyond and an end to the weaponization of education that has greatly slowed classroom reform while eating up time, resources and human capital. Such actions could ensure opportunities to reform education into a high-quality, modern and more uniform education system that is on par and even exceeds that of its neighbors. If history is a guide, these changes will come slowly, but they are possible, and the PISA results can at minimum serve as a rallying point.

The post The Problem with PISA and BiH: A Useful Indicator, but Only Part of the Story appeared first on Democratization Policy Council.

In early November last year, I attended a “Dialogue for the Future” seminar in Banja Luka organized by the nonprofit group Genesis Project. Local educators, administrators, social workers and others invested in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s youth discussed concepts including high-quality education and examined how BiH could use data from the soon-to-be-released PISA scores (https://www.6yka.com/novosti/ulazemo-li-dovoljno-u-obrazovanje-djeca-ce-najbolje-pokazati?fbclid=IwAR0Gio6bj-YEa4ZDsWuctr9MeCAhCZoyQtSraHow696okL01NeRMWXqmDpo).

Even though PISA wasn’t scheduled to release its results until December, both the seminar’s organizers and its attendees expected that BiH’s scores – this was the first time that the country was included in the PISA exercise – would reflect poorly on its education system. They didn’t need evidence from an international assessment to identify one of the more urgent challenges facing BiH’s schools—namely, the emphasis placed on rote memorization rather than the development of students’ critical thinking skills. 

PISA, which assesses students’ analytical skills and their ability to apply knowledge, confirmed the participants’ expectations when it released the results in December. The BiH scores suggest approximately half of the country’s students who took the exam are functionally illiterate in mathematics, science and reading (http://ba.n1info.com/Vijesti/a395232/Losi-rezultati-na-PISA-testovima-Svaki-drugi-ucenik-u-BiH-funkcionalno-nepismen.html).

The seminar’s focus on critical thinking and the concerns surrounding its inadequate role in BiH’s education system reflect what I hear more broadly in conversations with teachers, staff at youth NGOs, and students themselves. Their criticisms all describe a system that limits opportunities to develop and nurture students’ critical thinking skills. At a time when myriad media sources inundate people with an overwhelming amount of data and information, it is imperative that education systems guide students toward developing the higher-order thinking skills that will help them assess everything they consume. Neglecting critical thinking skills leaves students ill-prepared for a world where more information—reflecting varying degrees of reality—will continue to fly at them faster and faster.

There are multiple factors that contribute to a system where the development of critical thinking skills isn’t prioritized. For instance, one group of high school students in Banja Luka whose class I visited lamented the 15 separate courses they are required to take each semester. They attend most classes only once or twice per week. Cramming too much material into a small window limits the time students could spend assessing multiple perspectives of an historical event, or applying to different situations a concept they discussed in science class.

Some educators also raised this concern in early October when Civitas, the organization that designed the civics education curriculum in BiH, hosted its annual conference. Teachers commented on the challenges presented by once-a-week classes as they try to educate students about the structure of their government and promote civic engagement. Rather than reviewing theoretical concepts and then applying them in real-world situations, many teachers simply don’t have adequate time for the latter, leaving the purpose of civics education unfulfilled.

Students enjoy lessons requiring them to collaborate, analyze messages, and then share and defend their opinions. However, a lecture-style class directed by textbook material doesn’t lend itself to these activities. Teachers have reiterated their students’ criticisms. Some teachers point to a limited focus on methodology in pre-service teacher educator programs, and few or no opportunities to practice what they learn before taking on full-time positions. Others highlight few, if any, professional development opportunities to which they have access.

One of my conversations with a teacher illuminated the stark contrast that exists between teachers who have and those who have not had access to meaningful professional development opportunities. This teacher described a lesson they created asking students to evaluate different historical documents in the context of a specific event. Rather than lecturing the class about all of the information contained in the textbook, this teacher pulled some of the content and designed an activity forcing students to exercise their critical thinking skills. However, they created the activity using skills gleaned from professional development opportunities abroad. This teacher said their pre-service teacher educator program and the infrequent local professional development options available did not equip them with the skills necessary to produce such a lesson.

Improving an education system requires reforms at multiple levels. Making structural changes requires action from policymakers and often involves a drawn-out process. However, the aforementioned teacher’s comments about professional development mirrors what some of their colleagues highlighted at the Civitas conference. There, the same teachers who described strategies they used to incorporate practical application and critical thinking skills into their lessons also expressed a desire for more professional development. Educators who possessed knowledge worth sharing were asking for the space to share and learn.

Teachers shouldn’t have to wait for pedagogical institutes or ministries of education to organize professional development opportunities. A school employing 40 teachers possesses 40 resources, 40 minds brimming with ideas and experiences, all of whom could design a 20- or 30-minute workshop. Educators could organize these opportunities within their individual schools. Two teachers could present to their colleagues each month during a one-hour after-school session about a strategy they used to develop students’ higher-order thinking skills. Teachers could discuss how they can adapt these strategies to different content areas and grade levels. If two teachers present once a month, they would accumulate nine or 10 professional development hours each school year.

Of course, developing this culture and equipping teachers with skills to design creative lessons begins with university-level pre-service teacher educator programs. It also requires an environment in which teachers feel that such initiative will be nurtured, not deterred, and in which they enjoy the basic resources needed (in terms of their personal professional salary and the pedagogical materials/space needed to work in a 21^st century school). In spite of years of acknowledgment that these weaknesses exist, discussions at the classroom level demonstrate that there has not been a concerted effort to begin to address these needs. Some teachers mentioned a lack of funding that hamstrings local education administrations. One teacher, whose only professional development activity for the past six years has involved an annual meeting with their supervisor, noted an interest in further developing their pedagogical skillset, but was losing motivation.

A 2017 USAID report highlights pre-service teacher educator programs in BiH as “one of the weakest points in the education system overall, particularly in regard to primary education,” and “Without reform in initial teacher education, the effects of the implementation of standards will be limited” http://www.measurebih.com/uimages/Overview20of20Main20Challenges20in20Primary20and20Secondary20Education20in20BiH.pdf). This is a challenge requiring attention from individuals who shape policy. Localized professional development activities don’t require the same level of attention from the top.

Internally organized professional development initiatives won’t have as pronounced an effect on the education system as systemic changes to pre-service teacher educator programs. But they represent a start and are perhaps more feasible in the short-term. BiH’s PISA results underscore the urgency. Teachers can begin developing within their schools a culture that prioritizes professional development, collaboration among colleagues and dialogue about teaching methodologies. Teachers can initiate these workshops using the resources inside their school and in the near future without waiting for structural change, funding or months of planning. By learning from each other, teachers can acquire some of the skills necessary to adapt activities and promote the development of critical thinking skills. These workshops require a commitment from teachers, without which improvement in the quality of education BiH provides its students will not occur.

There are organizations providing professional development support for teachers; one NGO staff member highlighted the work of the Center for Educational Initiatives Step by Step, which spotlights critical thinking in its programming. NGOs must play a central role in delivering opportunities for teachers, particularly as a serious institutional void exists in this area. Professional development opportunities organized by external groups—or teachers independently holding sessions within their schools—cannot shoulder the burden in the long term. The decentralized nature of administrative education bodies in BiH hinders professional development across the country. Legitimate and sustainable improvement requires coordination across entity and canton lines, and then internationally.  

There are a few steps both the local and international communities can take to both improve the frequency of and access to professional development for teachers.

Pedagogical institutes, which are responsible for organizing professional development opportunities, should coordinate with each other and provide a centralized online repository where teachers can access information about professional development opportunities. They also should solicit feedback from teachers about potential topics for professional development sessions. This information, along with data procured from student performance and assessments like PISA, can guide the production of relevant workshops and seminars.

These surveys also create an opening through which teachers can volunteer to present to their colleagues about specific topics. Pedagogical institutes, schools, and NGOs all have the ability to provide teachers with the space and time to share their ideas. Offering teachers agency is pivotal in developing a culture that supports educators and their professional development.

Finally, uniform content standards would ensure that teachers in both entities and Brčko District develop lessons focused on the same learning outcomes. Designing such shared standards prioritizing critical thinking skills will result in teachers across BiH guiding students toward the same desired outcomes. Creating uniform standards also produces a situation conducive to idea-sharing and professional development opportunities relevant to all educators in BiH. The lack of a state-level education body capable of oversight presents a challenge when implementing uniform standards and coordinating inter-canton and entity activities. However, movement at the local level can provide at least a short-term shift toward developing a culture which values professional development and places critical thinking on a pedestal in schools. 

The post Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Pisa Fallout: Addressing the Critical Thinking Void Through Professional Development appeared first on Democratization Policy Council.

The last week has been like a whirlwind in the region, starting with the ICTY verdict sentencing Ratko Mladić to life imprisonment on November 22, and ending with the public and broadcasted suicide of Slobodan Praljak on November 29, moments after the judges delivered their decision confirming his conviction for war crimes. Both events can be described as theatrical, though they were urgently real; public political discussion in the region quickly evolved into an intricate and choreographed game of finger-pointing among the political leaders in the region. But what does this all mean for ordinary citizens?

In a country so divided, and with a governing system extreme by design, can I – can we – feel safe? Every time this country goes through a dramatic event, my first instinct is to go not to media portals and “mainstream” web sites, but to social media – because that’s where the people are nowadays. And the last ten days have been quite revealing. Beyond the Ratko Mladić support billboards in Zvornik, Pale and Srebrenica, the comments from ordinary citizens have been everything but rational and “reconciliatory”. Reconciliation is a word that might have held some hope or idealism 20, 10, or perhaps even 5 years ago, but has become so common and so abused in the everyday narrative in Bosnia and Herzegovina that it has completely lost its meaning and purpose.

Instead, we see the opposite of reconciliation – if that is even a concept. Comments ranging from, “We should have let the Serbs finish the job” to “We’ll be smarter next time” speak volumes, and definitely not of reconciliation. As I read them, I genuinely tried to understand where such emotions were coming from, and the sentiment(s) behind them. I have been especially curious about the age of the anonymous people writing these comments, as I assume that many of the most active users of social media are too young to have fought in the war themselves. What can account for such hatred?

Another thing that crossed my mind was – why aren’t the politicians trying to calm people down? And then I go and read some of the official statements of our politicians and everything becomes completely clear. The Croat member of the BiH Presidency’s statement that the sentencing of Praljak is a sentence on all Croats provides the faceless yet very real public a perfectly valid reason to be angry. The Serb-dominated entity Republika Srpska’s President Milorad Dodik’s statement that the Mladić verdict is a slap in the face of Republika Srpska and that Mladić will always have a place as a hero in the entity is also a perfectly valid reason for the public to be angry. After the Mladić verdict, Serbian media reported that 9,000 Bosniaks were being trained for war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, using photos of an airsoft game as actual photos of the training. Not long after the news broke in Serbian media, the airsoft clubs, whose photographs were used in the articles, reacted and stated that they have nothing to do with Bakir Izetbegović and that they’re just a sports association. The clubs were also surprised that some journalists are not familiar with airsoft and that they’ve linked it to paramilitary activities, and so they’ve been calling out to the public not to fall for the writings of certain media.

Hours after Praljak’s suicide, a wake was organized in Mostar for the “Hague’s 6” – attended by Croat leaders Dragan Čović and Martin Raguž – sending a clear message that Herceg-Bosna still lives, at least in people’s minds, and that real-world leadership is ready and willing to keep this issue alive. On the other side, the Bosniak member of the BiH Presidency, Bakir Izetbegović, spoke out after both ICTY verdicts, both times stating that no one should hold these convicts up as heroes and that he hopes the sentences will serve as a kind of sobering episode in the country and the region. With no meaningful substance or suggestions on how to move forward, though, it seems he is trying to create political relevance for himself which, if we are being honest, he lost a long time ago with the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

What worries me most is that normal, ordinary citizens who don’t wake up every day looking to demonstrate hate don’t have a voice, and are regularly not only dismissed, but diminished by the politicians who dominate the media playground. The instrumentalization of religion, ethnicity and identity has gone far beyond political games, I fear. We are approaching the realm of war games at this point, having been groomed by the steady and intentional political boil to expect an incident while at the same time deeply hoping it doesn’t happen. One of the rare cases of a positive message in the past couple of days was that of Friar Mile Babić. When asked about the prayer event scheduled to take place before the “Hague 6” verdict, he said that a national collectivism is in power – three of them – and we know each will, without any proof, defend its own as innocent, regardless that it is not in line with the truth. He also noted that it’s very important to enable democracy inside these collectivisms, without national leaders instructing the people on how to think. “Without personal freedoms and personal confrontations with the truth, we can’t make a civilizational step forward. If we want to become a healthy society and a democratic country, we will have to finish what The Hague started”, noted Friar Babić.

When thinking about extremism in this 21st century, the first thing that comes to mind is religious and ethnic fundamentalism, which at its core is an unholy union of doctrine married to political agenda. Over the past couple weeks in this country, I am reminded that this is everywhere, in three different, yet fundamentally similar, forms. We listen to experts talk about extremism at conferences, we read about it, we observe it and we’re constantly trying to identify the drivers of it, as if the drivers are hidden or obscured, when in reality they have been lurking in plain sight for over a generation.

This leads me to conclude that we have to go back to the basics, to the system itself. This system, corrupt and extreme at its core, not only enables the main political players to use inflammatory language and nationalistic rhetoric, but rewards them for it. And they are able to do so without fearing any consequences, either from a public captured by patronage and neutralized by marginalization and fear, or from an “International Community” which has long remained effectively mute on these and similar issues, and instead stands on stage with the very same individuals who stoke the embers of extremism to ensure the state of fear and crisis prevents hungry and frustrated people from really challenging this reality, as thousands did in 2014, striking fear – if for only a short time – into the political class.

The consequences these players don’t think about, it seems, are those felt in local communities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina by those forgotten by their governments, where unemployment is so high that ethnic sentiment is the only thing they can hold on to. This is a useful tool for manipulation, but I wonder if the politicians behind these dangerous sentiments think that they can indefinitely control the volatile emotions and dynamics they continue to stoke.

Extremism, but not violent extremism, is an everyday occurrence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And do I feel safe? No. But that is exactly the point.

The post Extremism: A Feature, not a Bug appeared first on Democratization Policy Council.

The second round of municipal elections in Macedonia, held on October 29th, compounded the sweeping victory two weeks ago of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), led by Prime Minister Zoran Zaev, over the party of his predecessor, Nikola Gruevski, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE). The extent of the sweep was shocking: SDSM won 18 of the remaining municipalities to VMRO-DPMNE’s 2. Former strongholds such as the eastern town of Štip, and the Skopje municipalities of Gazi Baba and Butel, fell to the SDSM juggernaut. Gruevski decried the results as fraudulent and illegitimate, constituting the “rape of the state,” and called for new general elections and a special prosecutor to review the December general elections and municipal elections.

At least as significant was the reconsolidation of the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), which won most of the municipalities in which it faced other ethnic Albanian parties: the Alliance of Albanians and BESA. The Alliance of Albanians, led by former Struga Mayor and MP Zijadin Sela, was instrumental in the coalition which aligned around SDSM; Sela was beaten unconscious in the VMRO-DPMNE-engineered attack on parliament on April 27. In the second round, BESA (which aligned with the coalition without joining it) and the Alliance of Albanians formed a coalition. Backed by Zaev, who actively campaigned on DUI’s behalf, and the SDSM, the DUI stanched the bleeding from December and rebounded. It held onto Tetovo and Skopje’s old quarter, Čair, but lost Gostivar, where former DUI Vice-President Nevzat Bejta was defeated by Alliance’s Arben Taravari. Sela, running for his prior job as mayor in Struga, was defeated by DUI candidate Ramiz Merko, who was supported by SDSM. While the Alliance won three municipalities and its vote numbers increased in the aggregate, this defeat provided the biggest plot twist of the election.

Prime Minister Zaev and the SDSM now have unchallenged political momentum. While there are no immediate indications that early general elections are in store, it is a certainty that some in the party – and outside it – will clamor for consolidating the parliamentary majority. The intra-coalition frictions posed by SDSM’s alignment with DUI, coupled with the Alliance’s second round coalition with BESA, and followed by the rise of nationalistic rhetoric from these parties may pose difficulties. However, the majority may yet be augmented by defections from other parties – even VMRO-DPMNE or its allies. Whether building a majority with such damaged goods would bolster SDSM’s aura of a fresh new initiative, let alone accelerate or impede reform, is questionable.

The preference shown for DUI by SDSM within the ruling coalition is noteworthy. DUI and its leadership were vital adjuncts to Gruevski’s architecture of power and abuse, as revealed not only in voting behavior, but also in the wiretapped recordings released by now-PM Zaev beginning in early 2015. Some Albanians have openly voiced dismay at the apparent total embrace of DUI in the municipal elections. PM Zaev’s campaigning for a party that was previously coalition partner to VMRO-DPMNE and part of Macedonia’s problem – making maintaining a divided society an integral element in the business model for parties of power – gives pause. SDSM’s ability to attract Albanian votes was proven in December 2016, and it followed up – although very modestly – with its own candidates in Albanian-majority municipalities. SDSM’s victory in Aračinovo was the crowning achievement of that effort. SDSM officials assert that its reticence in running candidates in Albanian-majority municipalities and its support of DUI is part of a longer game, and note that the messaging and tone of DUI candidates in the local elections has changed. Those who campaigned on a more integrationist agenda tended to win, they argue. This is another step on the road to building an integrated political space, in their view. But the sense of betrayal on the part of not only Sela and his Alliance, but also a large number of Albanians, will be a complicating factor.

Dominance in a system allows the pursuit of change; it does not make it inevitable. Zaev and his SDSM now have untrammeled political leverage in Macedonia, despite their still thin parliamentary majority. Coalition partners will cleave to them tighter. The argument that the SDSM needed to accommodate the DUI was arguable earlier; it is no longer. SDSM’s credibility in pursuing “one society” with those ethnic Albanians who wished to punish DUI no less than ethnic Macedonians evidently wished to punish VMRO-DPMNE appears diminished.

It is still early days in Macedonia. But the outlook and mood are vastly improved from the air of real crisis a year ago. This is no mean feat. Prime Minister Zaev’s personal political capital is massive. He has adopted an ambitious reform agenda – primarily remedial, though that remediation is urgently needed. But the SDSM is braving the risk of widening intra-ethnic tensions among Macedonians – and that cannot be neglected.

The way forward remains vague as of now. A blueprint for a new Macedonian governance operating system – a new social contract – has yet to be articulated. The DUI was formed to capitalize upon the opening created in the Ohrid Framework Agreement – and to be gatekeeper to those spoils for Macedonia’s ethnic Albanians. Can it adapt to a political environment in which tens of thousands of Albanians sought other options? Whether Zaev’s government’s promised effort to clean house will generate casualties within the coalition – and within the SDSM’s own ranks – remains to be seen.

As we wrote after the first round, following this electoral sea change, the onus is now on Prime Minister Zaev to push forward an ambitious reform agenda which aims to not just remediate the damage done by Gruevski and other governments which preceded his, but to shore up the country institutionally to prevent such abuses in the future. The coming year will demonstrate whether the SDSM’s true intention is to change the system, or simply control it.

The post The Challenge of Building ‘One Society’ Beckons for PM Zaev appeared first on Democratization Policy Council.