One could practically hear a collective sigh of relief across the European Union when Péter Magyar’s opposition party won a resounding victory and incumbent Prime Minister Viktor Orbán conceded defeat in Sunday’s crucial elections in Hungary. The election was critically important to the people of that country,  but it had also become a battleground for Russian disinformation, anti-Ukrainian messaging, amateur false flag claims of terrorist threats from Serbia, and the injection of American MAGA-right wing nationalism, which itself has been very much inspired by the illiberalism of Orbán’s 16 years in power. 

The congratulations are rolling in from leaders from across the European Union. Experience and the mindset of the Brussels technocratic machinery suggest that the EU will view this as a reset signaling that everything has turned for the better in Hungary and that everyone can return to business as usual. However, this moment should be seized as an opportunity for renewal and reflection. It should inform current and future policymaking by the EU, EU member states, and the broader democratic community.

Orbán’s loss and Magyar’s win is yet another important bellwether for understanding the rise of Hungary’s illiberal state model, while also now pointing to techniques for resistance to and reversal of such antidemocratic trends. 

A first step

For the people of Hungary, this is an important step – but only the first – in rolling back the political, social, and economic damage of the past 16 years. The experience of Poland under the Law and Justice Party (PiS) suggests that it’s far easier to break institutional systems and trust than to (re)build them.

It is heartening that Magyar has noted his commitment in restoring relations with the EU and NATO; this in itself will be a great asset in removing what had often become a weight on these institutions. But it bears repeating that Magyar himself comes from Fidesz and is part of the center-right mainstream. There is no reason to think that culture war issues will simply go away. In fact, it’s very important to remember that there is now a global network of wealthy and connected people who have demonstrated they are willing to spend money and political capital supporting the Orbán vision. Magyar will face numerous challenges as he seeks to rebuild institutions and employ judges and other civil servants who are committed to the country rather than just a party or an individual. Constitutional reform needs to be part of this rebuilding. Throughout the process, Magyar’s government will need to learn how to explain what they are doing and why to the people of Hungary, who have grown accustomed to rhetoric from a state machinery retrofitted to suit Fidesz – what has been termed a “competitive authoritarian regime.” The media machine that has been created over the years by Orbán’s cronies, who together with the state control an estimated 85% of the media, will in particular be difficult to dismantle and rebuild.

Clean-up job

A lot now depends on how Magyar works to clean up Hungary’s systems, as he and his team dig-out a decade and a half of corruption and self-dealing. It’s important to remember that it was the shared frustration with endemic corruption that enabled a unified opposition and brought 77% of the people out to vote. This shameless and widespread corruption (described as a “post-Communist mafia state” as early as 2016)  naturally accompanied the building of a state based on power, self-dealing and patronage, and which enabled the erosion of governance and services that ensues when bureaucrats and independent experts are bullied and replaced with loyalists and sycophants.  It took people getting fed up with this corruption to lead to this opposition victory. It will be interesting to see what connections, European and beyond, will be exposed in the coming weeks and months. The recent revelations of Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto’s reporting to his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, from EU meetings on sanctions like a control officer, foreshadow more such linkages.

Soul-searching in Brussels – and beyond?

At the level of the European Union and its machinery in Brussels, this development should prompt some soul-searching on how certain aspects of the EU itself enabled Orbán’s long hold on power. Let’s not forget how long it took to get Fidesz out of the center-right pan-European EPP; Fidesz finally left on its own in 2021 – Orbán’s 11^th year in power – following suspension in 2019, but remaining in the EPP European Parliamentary group for another two years.  This network has a lot to answer for in nurturing Fidesz (and other reactionary “national conservatives”). It will be interesting to see if they maintain public and friendly links with politicians and other reactionary figures coming over from the other side of the Atlantic. Closer to home, it’s important to remember that the EPP is still “investigating” Serbia’s ruling SNS following the numerous abuses of power by the party and President Aleksandar Vučić. 

In fact, the frustrations that finally hit a boiling point among people in Hungary will sound extremely familiar to citizens throughout the Western Balkans, who similarly feel that they have lost a generation to the same corrosive political and economic trends, following wider hope a generation ago in most of these countries. They have all experienced a different flavor of kleptocratic self-dealing and poor governance for much of the past three decades,  layered on top of the trauma and dislocation of the violence that accompanied the destruction of Yugoslavia. 

These trends also are becoming increasingly familiar to citizens of the US who have seen an even more rapid-fire dismantling of checks and balances and expertise over the past 16 months. 

Defending democracy

The EU (and the broader set of democratic countries that have been described by Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney as “middle powers” and by DPC as “Europe+”) would do well to learn from this and other cases to better formulate and message their own policies and remind their citizens of why democratic values and human rights are not just some lofty ideal but are inextricably related to governance success, broad-based and shared prosperity, and comprehensive security. 

Hungarians have demonstrated that democracy can and must be defended from below – and that it helps to have convincing, inspirational leadership which recognizes that need for a broad popular coalition in favor of a governance system based on rules, not connections or loyalty.

The EU should also consider the lesson that should be learned in terms of its enlargement agenda. Corruption and political and social control are not bugs in the system of countries struggling to move towards healthier democratic systems and ultimately EU membership. Rather, they are the feature of authoritarian and kleptocratic regimes that have as their bottom line consolidating and staying in power.

No business as usual

Tisza’s overwhelming victory cannot be an excuse for the EU simply breathing a sigh of relief, then coasting or returning to business as usual. The Union and its member states failed the diagnostic test that 16 years of Orbán’s increasingly disruptive rule – and his now demonstrated service to Moscow (and Trump’s MAGA movement) – posed to the EU as a community of rules and values. This needs to be remediated, including through developing EU-wide popular democratic defense and resilience. The influence of malign actors in Europe’s neighborhood and in the EU itself will only become more sophisticated and targeted. Finding ways to inoculate themselves from these infections will be critical and will include efforts to identify and counter disinformation, but also to find ways to maintain digital sovereignty over their information space. This will be needed to counter not only Russia but a United States under Trump and with its own emboldened and increasingly unaccountable Silicon Valley class. This class has weaponized US state power against the EU’s ability to defend the privacy and interests of its own citizens. 

However, for now, before sitting down to understand what happened to bring about this result and what could happen next at a time of global uncertainty and risk, one can be forgiven for wanting to exhale – and celebrate. But it should be taken not as a signal that everyone can relax, but as a moment that should be seized to regain the progress, momentum, and values-based self-confidence that the democratic world has allowed to shrivel during a period in which antidemocratic forces have shown increased swagger.

The post The people of Hungary deserve support, not complacency appeared first on Democratization Policy Council.

Prime Minister Mark Carney’s Liberal Party will return to power for a fourth straight term. This despite having been down double digits in polls just months ago against the opposition Conservatives, led by challenger Pierre Poilievre. Trump’s levying tariffs and open advocacy of annexing Canada as “the 51st state” were decisive for Canadian voters, who deemed Carney, former Bank of Canada and Bank of England Governor, the safer pair of hands, given the nature of the threat to the country’s economy and independence.

This electoral result has wider implications, being the starkest popular reaction thus far in the democratic world to Trump’s performative cruelty and assault on democratic norms at home, together with his direct confrontation with steadfast allies, partners, and the international system which the US previously championed. The tectonic ruction of Trump’s disruption-by-design has generated adjustment throughout the democratic world, but Canada’s has been deepest, most resolute, and profound. Foreign Minister Melanie Joly demonstrated this three weeks ago at a NATO meeting.

Voters have now reinforced her conclusion. Nowhere in the democratic world has the breach – driven by Trump – elicited so clear a response. This includes a redoubled commitment to Canada’s ties to Europe, but also Pacific democracies, those in the Western hemisphere, and Africa as well. Canada has demonstrated it’s possible to resist and adapt to changing circumstances while maintaining the values that have consistently made it a global magnet. This can provide a boost to Europe+ and hopefully provide momentum for resistance against the illiberal spasm that is doing so much harm to so many. Europe+ needs now to demonstrate a similar recognition of this changed world.

The will to straddle and hedge remains strong, as NATO SG Mark Rutte demonstrates. This is unequal to the moment. Europe+ should take this opportunity to maintain and strengthen the values that have enabled economic and social development for decades, in the face of a tide of self-dealing authoritarianism worldwide.

Countries that recognize the importance of democratic values for not only prosperity and rights, but individual dignity, would do well to recognize the need for far greater coordinated action to withstand the multifaceted threats to liberal movements and the kleptocracy that comes with them. The call for solidarity from Canadians is one that Europe+ – the remaining democratic world – must heed. This will demand creativity, popular solidarity within and among democracies, and crucially leadership.

The opportunity for Brussels, London, Paris, Berlin and others to rally to the challenge is clear. At the moment those with the most to lose from authoritarianism – Canadians and Greenlanders, along with Ukrainians – have demonstrated the strongest clarity of vision.

As Foreign Minister Joly underscored, the people with the power to stop Trump are Americans. After his first 100 days, it seems increasingly clear that they are recognizing the danger as well, not only to their neighbors, but themselves and their rights. Unless and until Americans brake and reverse his agenda, Europe+ has to make its own arrangements, wrenching though that may be. Canada leads the way.

The post Canadians Lead the Way appeared first on Democratization Policy Council.

The gratuitous and protracted killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police on Memorial Day spurred an unprecedented outpouring of black American demands for police accountability and systemic change – beginning in Minneapolis, with some high visibility instances of property destruction, looting, and violence.  But in the main, nationwide protests have been peaceful.  They also exhibit hitherto unseen transracial and societal solidarity, well outside the urban areas where protest began.  This is a rapidly developing constituency with the potential to drive a major recalibration of American society.

Much remains uncertain.  But the breadth of the perception gap builds on an already stunning polarization in American society as the November elections approach – and the prevalence of firearms (and their centrality in the identity, in particular, among Trump’s constituency) makes this a particularly volatile moment.  What became abundantly clear with Trump’s attempt to militarize responses to protests and unrest, as well as having Lafayette Square cleared of peaceful protesters for his photo op at St. John’s Church, was that there are no limits to his efforts to drive polarization.  It is not incidental to his agenda.  It is essential.

The political dynamics playing out at present emerge organically from the soil of America’s four centuries of racial oppression and inequity.  But the Black Lives Matter Movement and demonstrations nationwide gained a global resonance and solidarity, spurring societal reflections and calls for justice.  These are both closely related to the abuse of power which generated the popular outrage – systemic police brutality, but also local issues of systemic unfairness and lack of reckoning with the past.  So while this historical moment emerged with specific American contours, it is a global one. 

Some parallels can be made from quarters not typically high in the US public consciousness.  Trump’s operating system is strongly reminiscent of those which have played out from the late 1980s to date in the former Yugoslavia.  The resemblance is so strong that I have called Trump “our first Balkan president.”  

Inated States of America

Trump’s initial and continuing appeal to his constituency has been reaction to and fear of societal change, as well as resentment at its perceived prime movers and beneficiaries.  In what became the waning days of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević appealed to Serbs, first in Kosovo where they felt outnumbered and displaced from a rightful dominance by the majority ethnic Albanians, but then throughout Yugoslavia, playing on their sense of having been cheated in the multinational Yugoslav federation.  A potent element in his – and other nationalists’ – repertoire was inat (Ee-not), a word brought via Ottoman Turkish usually translated as “spite,” but closer in meaning to German schadenfreude, requiring a longer explanation in English.  It connotes in four letters “this is going to hurt me, but it’s going to hurt you more – and I am going to enjoy that you are suffering.”  While English has no snappy equivalent, it is clearly felt here and has become pandemic.  “Owning the libs,” “rolling coal,” and “triggering” are all evidence of this trend.  Donald Trump’s harnessing a deep seam of untapped inat made him president.  His administration has been a breeder reactor of it ever since. 

The fear of a reckoning for past wrongdoing can be a strong bonding agent for communities and societies.  This was evident in Nazi Germany in 1945, as Allied armies advanced from east and west. Germans flocked westward, fearing the revenge of a ravaged Soviet Union.  In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnian Serb separatist leader Milorad Dodik has often said the country was untenable because of Bosniak desire for “revenge,” while continuing to deny that genocide had been committed against them by Bosnian Serb forces in the war – a legally established fact.  His rationale was clearly to frighten Bosnian Serbs to cleave to his leadership, for fear of being overwhelmed.  Demographic fear of being outnumbered by Muslim fellow citizens proved of great utility as a mobilizing tool among Serbs in particular; a “green transversal” theory was touted – and remains in circulation.  Genocidal policies and acts from the wars of the 1990s have provided inspiration for white identity nationalist violence worldwide, most vividly in Anders Breivik’s 2011 Utoya massacre in Norway and in the Christchurch shootings in 2019.  The “great replacement” theory – that whites and Christians will be outnumbered and dominated by migrants and non-Christian minorities – gained traction in Europe and the wider West, despite the evidence contradicting the apocalyptic Clash of Civilizations visions.

While the demographics at play in the United States are very different – African Americans are 13% of the population – the fears of the waning of white dominance in the US have been central to Trump’s appeal to “Make America Great Again.”  But the direction of travel toward whites ceasing to be the majority in just a generation, provides an ambient fear environment undergirding the entire Trump agenda.  Trump’s referring to white nationalist demonstrators at a “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville as “very fine people” was widely seen as validation. (The rally featured a Nuremberg-style torchlit march in which participants chanted “you will not replace us! Jews will not replace us!” and one antifascist demonstrator, Heather Heyer, was killed and several more critically injured in a deliberate car attack.) The fact that Trump advisor Stephen Miller, behind the Muslim ban and institutional brutality toward asylum seekers, is reputed to be writing an upcoming Trump speech on race, is indicative of the likely content.  The timing and venue of that speech – initially scheduled to be delivered on June 19^th in Tulsa, Oklahoma – seems as calculated and egregious an expression on inat politics as any in the Trump presidency.  June 19, “Juneteenth,” is the day American blacks celebrate the end of slavery; Tulsa was the scene of a particularly devastating racial pogrom against the black community in 1921.  The fact that the rally has been shifted a day has done nothing to dull the initial message sent that black lives do not matter, but rather only provides (im)plausible deniability.

Such calculated polarization to maintain power remains endemic in post-Yugoslav politics.  A Catholic mass in Sarajevo, sponsored by the parliament of Croatia, to commemorate victims of the summary executions by Tito’s partisans of Croat and other collaborationists (including civilians) fleeing Yugoslavia in Bleiburg in 1945 was the most recent such example of spectacles designed specifically to inflame and divide.  The backlash in Sarajevo against the mass was predictable, though its scale surprised many during the current pandemic.

Now that a much more pronounced demand for an end to police brutality against blacks has been made, and the disproportionate harm the coronavirus has wreaked upon the black population in particular (and people of color more broadly) has come into focus, demands for a more thorough recalibration of the American social contract and order are being heard.  It precipitated palpable angst, particularly in exurban and rural white Trump strongholds, in large part due to disinformation.  Yet in that same terrain, less predictably, unprecedented solidarity demonstrations continue.  Polling conducted on June 9-10 shows overwhelming support for peaceful protests, with even a 59 percent majority of Republican respondents in favor – 82 percent for banning police chokeholds.  This is a tectonic shift.

Trump’s call on governors to “dominate” the protests, employing overwhelming force, as well as insistence on the theatrical deployment of National Guard and militarized, unidentified federal agents, demonstrates a clear desire to play to those fears and escalate a sense of crisis.  It is likely that he wanted to seize the initiative to precipitate more confrontation and violence, to give both a pretext for the harsh crackdown he desired and to scare white voters who might have thought of gravitating to Biden or sitting the election out into voting for him.  In essence, by escalating radically, he aimed to force them to choose between fear and a sense of justice or fairness.  The greater the perception of chaos, the more likely they would vote for him.

Efforts to escalate deep social divides for political gain were seen recently in another part of the former Yugoslavia – North Macedonia – twice in two years.  In both cases – a still murky firefight between security forces and ethnic Albanian militants in the town of Kumanovo in May 2015 and a “spontaneous” nationalist attack on opposition lawmakers to prevent the formation of a government in April 2017 – the evident aim was to stoke fears of renewed ethnic conflict (or even actual violence) to justify a clampdown and Nikola Greuvski remaining in control (in 2015 as prime minister; in 2017 as the clear power behind a caretaker government).  In neither case did it have the desired effect.  Gruevski is now a political asylee in Viktor Orbán’s Hungary.

Trump’s Phantom Paramilitary Boogeymen

Dominance of media isn’t feasible as before – but it doesn’t need to be once society is so polarized that the information space is effectively politically segregated.  In this world – in broadcast, online, and social media – Antifa, a loose self-organized agglomeration of leftist streetfighters who sometimes appear at demonstrations and engage in violence, has been amplified from the fringe phenomenon it truly is into a fearsome paramilitary army in the Trumpworld imaginary.   But this has already had real world consequences, with peaceful multiracial Black Lives Matter marchers having to pass a long lineup of heavily armed residents in northeast Indiana – in sight of police – being just one of many examples of the potential confrontations set up trough manufactured fear. 

In the past week, Fox News’ Tucker Carlson has provided a perfect window into this dynamic, showing a number of Yugoslav-era parallels.  In his monologue, Carlson acts deliberately as a white fear agitator and amplifier – both to Fox’s overwhelmingly white, right-wing viewership, but at least as importantly to President Trump himself, playing to his most authoritarian and repressive instincts.  It is, in effect, an admonition not to “go wobbly,” but rather to radicalize, as demonstrated in Lafayette Square.  He spoke of “the mob” swarming “like hornets,” calling on those in government to “protect your people.”  Carlson in particular among major media commentators is promoting what might be called a “black scare,” stoking an ambient fear of chaos which can only be met with repression, both from the government, but also from militia types.  The fact that such messages continue long after any significant incidence of property damage or violence from demonstrators is telling.  In a recent episode, he argued that any engagement with the Black Lives Matter movement was a slippery slope.  Maintaining group homogenization – and segregation – is a staple of top-down Balkan politics.

This is a typical post-Yugoslav technique.  Bosnian Serb political leader Milorad Dodik, for example, could have scripted this immediate grasp for the lever of fear.  In response to demonstrations at poverty and lack of accountability which erupted in Bosnia and Herzegovina in early 2014, Dodik spoke darkly of the threat to the Republika Srpska from the neighboring Federation half of the state, illegally establishing checkpoints, as well.  But he was simply the best positioned to act with coercive power on the fears he stoked; other politicians in the country had parallel instincts to ethnicize the protests to deflect public anger away from themselves. The fact that this failed to gain traction was not lost on citizens throughout the country.  Four years later, following the still murky murder of a Banja Luka youth, David Dragičević, demonstrations began, led by his father, Davor, against widely suspected police misconduct and perhaps involvement.  The deep public distrust of the official version from Dodik’s authorities helped the movement grow – and gain palpable solidarity across ethnic lines, merging with demonstrations in Sarajevo against authorities for the killing of local youth Dženan Memić – also with high suspicion of official malfeasance.  The fathers of the young men became allies and friends – and struck fear into the static political establishment like no bottom-up effort since the war.  Violent suppression of demonstrations in Banja Luka in late 2018 broke the momentum.  But the demonstrated popular solidarity challenged the dark soul of the country’s corrupt power-sharing machine, showing the limits to the effectiveness of the old divisive toolkit. In another parallel, the Covid-19 crisis has given established political leaders the ability to direct public resources in blatantly self-dealing ways – or without any transparency at all.  This phenomenon was observed ludicrously in Bosnia, where an SDA-connected raspberry farmer was able to get a concession for ventilators at an absurd markup – a fact exposed through investigative journalism.  In the US, Trump’s Treasury Department refuses to disclose the distribution of $500 billion in aid to businesses, with Treasury Secretary Stephen Mnuchin stating that the information concerning this public money was “proprietary.”  In both cases, fear of accountability is evidently absent, as patronage is surely present.

The movement’s rapid growth, wide reach, and wider pool of sympathy may, counterintuitively, stiffen resistance and its recalcitrance.  The very diversity of participation in the growing demonstrations, as well as their broad reach, is likely an amplifier of angst for a certain segment of the white population.  If my children, grandchildren, friends or neighbors don’t evidently share my fears, at least I know Trump does – and he has my back. 

Over the course of the Trump presidency, much has been made of his erratic nature, that he seems to lack a governing strategy.  But in a land without strategic opponents, the intuitive tactician is king.  Trump has a thin playbook (the very term is antithetical to his ethos), but the plays in it are tried and true.  General James Mattis correctly observed he hasn’t even tried to unite the American people.  This is by design.  He never could to begin with; his goal is to keep his own constituency galvanized behind him and to keep his opponents divided or otherwise neutralized.  The noxious, caustic atmosphere of division, resentment, fear, and enemies is the only air that he can breathe to survive politically.

His trip to the White House bunker was therefore metaphorically perfect, as well as a reflection of genuine fear – leading to his performance of authoritarianism in “the battle of Lafayette Square.”  The broadening of a popular movement for change against police brutality, which he has advocated and supported, does not bode well for him.  The terms of the political discourse in America have already changed radically as a result first of a global pandemic, and now a concurrent movement demanding equality and justice.  That changes the atmospheric composition to one upon which Trump cannot survive.

Social movement research demonstrates that developing breadth in a movement – and cutting into support bases of the regime – dramatically increases the possibility of success.  And this is precisely what Trump fears.  Furthermore, the loyalty of security forces is also essential.  The unwillingness of the (rump) Yugoslav Army and much of the police to violently disperse crowds in Belgrade after Slobodan Milošević’s attempt to steal an early presidential election put paid to his regime – and ultimately landed him in the dock to face war crimes charges.  The statements by former Secretary of Defense James Mattis and several other secretaries of defense, chiefs of staff, and defense officials are clearly aimed at encouraging those in uniform to not obey an illegal order.  The June 11^th statement by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Mark Milley that his appearance with the president in his photo op had been “a mistake” which made the military appear political, amplified this.

We may never know what went through Trump’s mind as he heard chanting crowds outside the White House and hurried downstairs.  But his phone call to governors and photo op soon after seemed an attempt to calm himself, to “take back control.”  But like the Wizard of Oz, his machinery failed him.  Unfortunately, he is not the only one afraid.  And we can count on the fact that he will do his utmost to amplify and capitalize on those fears.  There’s nothing scarier than scared white people.

The post Polarization for Power and Profit: the Balkan Echoes of Trump’s Politics appeared first on Democratization Policy Council.

Executive Summary

On October 17, 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron once again pre-empted the launch of European Union accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania, forestalling them until further notice. His move was only tenuously linked to the individual merits of either country. Its real rationale was evident at the time and came into fuller relief with his subsequent interview with The Economist: Macron halted enlargement to force other member states – Germany in particular – to engage him on his ambitious – but still only lightly sketched – agenda to reconfigure the EU.

Immediately prior to the November meeting of the EU’s General Affairs Council, France released a non-paper that underscored that the enlargement halt was not really about enlargement at all. The non-paper was rife with contradictions and redundancies. Its main proposed innovation is a rejiggering of the enlargement policy into seven sequential phases. But the document also demonstrated a worrisome elite orientation, and was void of reference to or grounding in the EU’s foundational source code: the primacy of liberal democratic values and standards. This portends ill for Macron’s vision of the EU more broadly.

The non-paper’s focus is on delivering “tangible benefits” in economic matters. Despite the EU’s recent embrace of the term “state capture” and a new focus on corruption, these terms are absent from the French text. In essence, the non-paper proposes throwing more resources at entrenched elites in the countries of the Western Balkans, to rent social peace for them – and a predictable status quo for the EU.

Far from being a sideshow, the struggle for EU foundational values is and must be central to the problems in the Western Balkans today. The illiberal challengers Macron cites – China, Russia, Turkey – are all heavily and increasingly engaged in the region.

While solidarity among the other EU members in response to Macron’s move is laudable, the default inclination seems to be to finesse differences, and to concede an enlargement approach based on minor, largely cosmetic adjustments. This would mean to let a good crisis go to waste, both in terms of a long-overdue recalibration of the EU’s enlargement strategy, as well as orientation toward an equally necessary, but still uncharted, recalibration of the EU to face the internal challenges of nativist illiberal populism, yawning inequality, and the climate emergency.

Recommendations

DPC recommends a different course to EU member states committed to enlargement and the EU-wide reinforcement of liberal democratic values, at a time when they are challenged both within the Union and from east and west. This does not require any major changes to mechanics, mandates, or procedures, but rather a philosophical shift in approaching the countries of the Western Balkans. The 2015-17 breakthrough in North Macedonia demonstrated two things: a) that the EU’s institutional default setting has for too long been on the side of illiberal elites; and b) the reality that in the expansion of a values-focused EU in the Western Balkans, citizens – not elites – are the Union’s real allies.

1) Instead of taking the low road and simply restarting the enlargement policy with cosmetic changes, EU member states ought to take the opportunity to assess the process seriously and self-critically – with criticism of not just the WB6, but of the EU and its member states. The Council should commission an external diagnostic analysis of enlargement in the Western Balkans to date, to understand why genuine reform has been so shallow and lackluster, and with particular attention to the adherence to foundational liberal democratic values (i.e., the Copenhagen criteria).

2) The EU does not play a neutral role when it leaves exponents of its declared values to confront illiberal governments alone. It is complicit, abandoning its natural allies. Lending the EU’s top-down support would help redress this structural imbalance. Placing civic engagement and political accountability at the center of a new enlargement policy would generate the popular traction and credibility that the current EU enlargement approach has long lacked.

3) Annual “Priebe reports” – independent assessments of Western Balkan countries’ adherence to EU foundational values and Copenhagen criteria – should become an integral element of the EU’s engagement, followed by active support to local independent constituencies to address structural weaknesses identified. These would provide connective tissue between civic advocacy to end state capture by corrupt elites to institutional rule of law and democracy and the Union.

These are initial recommendations for what needs to be an ongoing exercise in honest analysis and diagnostics. Yet these are key first principles that, if internalized, could help to strengthen both the EU and future member states.

Download full paper

The post The EU Must Shift Out of Neutral in Its Enlargement Strategy: Championing Liberal Values Means Choosing Sides appeared first on Democratization Policy Council.