Turnout reached nearly 70%, an extraordinary level not seen since Vučić’s role model Slobodan Milošević was ousted more than 25 years ago. The victory was so decisive that a visibly downcast Vučić was forced to concede just 90 minutes after polls closed and before any media projections. 

In his concession statement, Vučić acknowledged the scale of the loss and noted that the Student List had won an estimated 139 seats to the SNS’ 105. His early concession shocked many who felt this was out of character. 

However, Vučić quickly reverted to form by blaming “lies” as well as unnamed European forces and a US anti-Trumpdeep state for his loss. 

Serbia erupted in celebrations at Vučić’s concession. But one quote from the mother of one of the 16 victims of the Novi Sad railway station disaster, which touched off the student movement two years ago, captured the gravity of the moment:

“I have been waiting for this moment for two years. Now I expect that they will all be held accountable,” Dijana Hrka said. Accountability and an end to impunity were the binding agent of a student-launched popular movement which spanned the entirety of Serbia.

In the end, the vote reached 52% for the SL and 39% for the SNS, with only minority parties (which are exempt from the 3% electoral threshold) able to enter the 250-seat parliament in addition to the SL and SNS.

The scale and import of the SL’s victory – and the organization and energy it demanded – cannot be downplayed. Soon, congratulatory messages started coming in, for example from the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission.

They face a deeply entrenched security apparatus and a state which had been captured top-to-bottom by the SNS. The security state’s provenance goes back even further; much of it remained unreconstructed after the wars of the 1990s.

Now, the SNS is the only recognizable and organized party system in Serbia. The previous (and largely discredited) opposition parties were completely eliminated by the SL’s mass appeal and momentum.

The Serbian constitution adopted in 2006 was drafted to deny legitimacy to Kosovo’s efforts towards independence. It was not designed with the primary goal of ensuring democratic accountability – the Student List’s main priority.

European Union membership was not an SL talking point. The EU itself spurned direct contact with the movement during high-visibility marathons to Strasbourg and Brussels in 2025. But the next government’s policy decisions will shape Serbia’s geopolitical orientation and its prospects for EU membership. 

Finally, Vučić built a de-facto presidential system (with some help from predecessor Boris Tadić). Presidential elections to be held by the end of the year to fill the vacancy left by Vučić will be an immediate challenge for the SL.

While the SL has eschewed personality politics, it will need to find a champion to compete in order to consolidate its victory and be able to fulfil its mission to establish political and legal accountability in Serbia.

Not only the rest of the region (especially Albania and next-door Bosnia and Herzegovina), but all of Europe and the rest of the democratic world, can take inspiration from the determination, solidarity, and steadfastness of the student-led movement which built such an electoral victory.

The bottom-up nature of this movement shows the dissatisfaction with the political options on offer and the desire for a fresh, more organic political process to replace the political party and elite machines that have dominated for so long.

It will be interesting to see if protesters in Albania look to this model for inspiration and adaptation. And at a time of several electoral victories by right/far-right parties around the world, it shows the possibility for another way of democratic renewal.

The EU and the wider community of democracies in Europe+ have a responsibility to help the movement succeed in achieving a democratic and accountable Serbia. Not only for the sake of their own declared values – but also in the interest of a more cohesive democratic Europe.

The post The Student List Victory in Serbia – A Rejection of Elite Politics appeared first on Democratization Policy Council.

Book Review:

John Keane, The Shortest History of Democracy: 4,000 Years of Self-Government – A Retelling for Our Times. The Experiment, New York. 2022

Occasionally, an airport book display presents a volume which grabs me. John Keane’s The Shortest History of Democracy: 4,000 Years of Self-Government – A Retelling for Our Timeswas on a bookshelf at Dulles International is one such book, I am very glad that I read it. And I am also glad that this book – just a few years old now – is being recognized as a book of popular interest in these times of change, for either end-of-season vacationers or the business traveler set. The fact that it’s four years old and on display now is noteworthy. I applaud whoever chose to do so, for the book highlights the contemporary challenges to democracy, which are far more acute now in the Trump 2.0 era.

Overall, it’s a brilliant survey of the development and ever-evolving practice of democracy. I learned a great deal from reading it. It also bears note that it reads very well. What’s truly excellent is that he really broadens the story to include precursors to Athenian assembly democracy, where the story typically begins, all the way back to antecedents in Mesopotamia at the advent of recorded civilization, as well as the cosmological mirroring involved – the gods were plural and debated each other. To me, this was a completely new angle, but one whose logic seems self-evident – once presented. Efforts to hold human power accountable go way back.

His categorization of assembly democracy (citizens meeting in person to make decisions), representative democracy (citizens electing representatives to decide on public matters), and postwar evolution of what he defines as monitory democracy – the engagement of broad elements of watchdogs and civic assemblages outside formal democratic representational structures in the public accountability ecosystem – was also very well presented and justified. Again, in each segment, there were stories which were familiar, and those which I wish I had known of long ago – like the 1980 “smile revolution” in Uruguay. While it didn’t return democracy in one leap, it did draw a line and prevent the normalization of the “civil-military” regime which seized power in 1973 – and set the stage for democracy’s return. I wonder how much the Chileans saw this as a reference point for their own “no” campaign in the plebiscite in 1988 which prevented Pinochet’s entrenchment. 

It was only when I got to the reference on Czechoslovakia and the on-the-ground dynamics of what later became known as “the Velvet Revolution” in November 1989 that the synapse fired: is this the same Keane who wrote that great (and much longer) biography of Václav Havel, one of my heroes? I’d read that years ago, when working on the Diplomat’s Handbook for Democracy Development Supportwith Amb. Jeremy Kinsman – Havel wrote a preface for it. Sure enough, it is. Professor John Keane is Professor of Politics at the University of Sydney and Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin, as well as founder of the Centre for the Study of Democracy in London and the Sydney Democracy Network.

Keane also writes convincingly on the reality that democratic practice is undergoing constant evolution and tailoring to local circumstances, customs, and desires. The central sine qua nons of democracy in his taxonomy are legal, systemic, and norm-based protections for human dignity against unaccountable power, as well as citizen agency in democratic systems. He lists a number of practices which developed all over the globe – participatory budgeting, citizens’ assemblies, and so on – and caught on far more widely.

Finally, Keane surveys the scope of the threats and challenges to democracy – and presents his view that the neoliberal capitalist model and wealth stratification itself presents a threat to democratic practice, by empowering a narrow stratum in pursuit of policies for their own benefit and entrenchment. Furthermore, he observes the direct threat to not just human life, but all life on earth, from these power imbalances, as well as the practices of “poligarchs” who have developed impressively resilient and mutually reinforcing systems to maintain and deepen their power.

Fast forward to the near future of 2026. The threats to democracy and life on Earth as we know it are even more clearly defined. To the former, Trump’s re-election in 2024 brought an unrestrained, hungry, and vengeful administration to office which dispensed with even ostensible support for democracy abroad in favor or pursuit of national interest, “dominance” (including in generating and burning hydrocarbons), and “civilizational” identity – lamenting a Europe which began “contracting” in 1945. It also turned on a Ukraine defending itself against Russian imperialism, directing the material support for its counteroffensive to Israel’s conduct of a genocidal campaign in Gaza – and later to an unprovoked war with Iran. Meanwhile, democratic practice at home came under direct, concerted assault, including the ability of voters to select their representatives and even practice the franchise, as well as efforts to “destroy the administrative state,” as Trump ideologist Steve Bannon put it early in the first term. This has been enabled by the complete subordination of the Republican-led Congress to Trump and the disposition of the US Supreme Court to accept a “unitary executive theory” which amounts to a throwback to the pre-1789 divine right of kings.

Trump has also acted as a force multiplier for AI billionaires, championing their breakneck construction of environmentally devastating data centers. More than any other action on the home front, this has brought together communities – even those which overwhelmingly voted for Trump – to protect their water, pocketbooks, and each other. The aggregate political impact of this backlash remains to be seen. But to pan out, a cursory look at Europe, Latin America, Africa, and the whole sweep of Asia and Oceania demonstrates that the threats to democracy from within are far from simply an American issue. But nor is the popular will to organize to push for and defend systems of institutionalized dignity and agency – and there is much to learn from the front lines in locales as disparate as Kathmandu, Kampala, and Tirana.

Keane closes on a hopeful note which I will quote:

(D)emocracy shows us that no man or woman is perfect enough to rule unaccountably over their fellows, or the fragile lands and seas in which they dwell. Is that not a global value?

The post Democracy’s Long March appeared first on Democratization Policy Council.

Gest explores a number of cases around the world and combines in depth interviews with a wide variety of quantitative data. It’s worth reading as once again immigration is in the news and a familiar talking point for those who in particular want to stoke polarization and fear of “the other.”

Even more importantly, it’s a reminder of why, until recently, successful democratic countries invested in democracy support and promotion around the world; an approach grounded in comprehensive security that has unfortunately been increasingly squeezed out by zero-sum and short-term realpolitik thinking.

https://balkaninsight.com/2026/08/11/why-emigrants-prefer-democracies-and-leave-illiberal-states-behind/bi

The post Book Review: Democratic Drain: Global Migration and the Struggle for Democracy appeared first on Democratization Policy Council.

The post It’s Time ‘Europe+’ Asserted Leadership and Challenged the US in Bosnia appeared first on Democratization Policy Council.

Kliknite ovdje za verziju na lokalnom jeziku.

1/ Two days before his semiannual report to the UN Security Council, High Representative Christian Schmidt announced that he would be resigning his post as international High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). However, he also stated he would remain in post until a successor is chosen.

https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/christian-schmidt-odlazi-sa-funkcije-visokog-predstavnika-u-bi-h

2/ The move comes after months of speculation that the US wanted Schmidt to leave and applied pressure. It follows the marked American shift in policy in BiH beginning last October, with the blanket lifting of sanctions on convicted former RS President Milorad Dodik, who remains the de facto leader of the entity.

3/ This shift was also manifest in reported US admonitions against using the executive Bonn Powers, which the US had previously assertively supported – including their application during Schmidt’s near five-year tenure.

4/ @DPCGlobal has been highly critical of some of Schmidt’s actions. But it is important that Schmidt remains until a successor is named and can arrive – otherwise, the US will be able to seize control of OHR by default, if American Principal Deputy High Representative Louis Crishock has the helm as acting High Rep.

5/ Schmidt’s announcement also notably follows the passage of legislation in the Federation regarding the Southern Interconnector project, as well as an interstate treaty between BiH and Croatia – moves aggressively pushed by the US.

6/ The EU has made its misgivings on the SIC known in a letter by EU Head of Delegation Luigi Soreca to FBiH officials. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/23/eu-risks-fallout-with-us-trump-linked-balkans-pipeline-plan-intervention

7/ Dodik has been clear he wants state property fully under his control in the RS. Diplomatic sources relate to DPC that the US and Italy would be fine with a Dodik-friendly arrangement for their own interests.

http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/DPC-Policy-Note18_State-Property-in-BiH.pdf

8/ While the US may be playing for simple transactionalism and opportunity for profit, the confluence of these deals in the present environment are a recipe for even more state-weakening and ethno-territorial division of BiH, reinforced by foreign malign influence.

9/ So now the pressure is on Europe+ to come up with a Bosnia – and wider Balkan – strategy to protect its values and interests from all geopolitical challengers, starting with the US.

10/ The first step needs to be to resist the selection of a Schmidt successor who will accommodate the Trump administration’s transactionalist interests in BiH.

11/ Europe+’s members in the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) – the UK, Canada, Japan, and EU members France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain need to propose a strategy to the Union as a whole, and soon, to avoid a vacuum the US could exploit in the short-term, but with long-term consequence.

12/ Europe+ needs to ensure that it chooses Schmidt’s successor that will be ready to wield a strategy to continue to employ the Bonn Powers in the service of the Annex 10 mandate, to insure BiH’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,…

13/…protect institutions built since Dayton, and to help citizens of BiH make confident moves to a post-Dayton social contract that would enable meaningful progression towards EU accession.

14/ This will need to entail a commitment to cover the entire OHR budget – as it may well be that the US makes its displeasure felt at not getting its way by not paying its contribution. While many Europeans may balk, this is relative pocket change when compared to the influence that can have in BiH & the region.

15/ Furthermore, and just as crucially, Europe+ needs to reflect a “coalition of the willing” in maintaining a capable EUFOR by reinforcing it to brigade strength prior to October 2026 elections to demonstrate resolve to outside actors seeking to permanently destabilize the country and region.

16/ BiH is the central conflict generator and reservoir in the Western Balkans, having dragged both Croatian and Serbian democratic development backwards by being allowed by the EU-led “West” – now a term devoid of geopolitical meaning – for 20 years.

17/ Calls for Schmidt not to be replaced and OHR closed are deeply irresponsible – and either highly cynical or deluded in light of the facts on the ground and current trendlines.

18/ BiH’s Dayton political economy and operating system makes the political class gatekeepers for external actors seeking to benefit from public goods.

19/ Despite the clamor for state property to be resolved to promote “investment,” it is clear that until the country’s constitutional system is replaced with a new social contract, no resolution in the public interest is feasible.

20/ Appointing a US-approved High Rep to “resolve” state property would only enrich a handful of political spoilers and further undermine the country’s sovereignty, integrity, and declared aim of EU membership.

21/ Despite hopes in Brussels and member state capitals that they could simply do more of the same in the Western Balkans, Europe+ will have to upshift in BiH if it wants to prove itself a potent actor in its own “courtyard,”…

22a/ …and not allow a US in its own state of democratic decline to destabilize the country and region for its own short-term gain.

22b/ Sidestepping confrontation with Trump’s US by ceding influence would constitute appeasement, yielding permanent instability not only in BiH, but regionally.

23/ And nowhere on earth is Europe+ more potent collectively than the WB6, BiH in particular. If it doesn’t draw the line here, it is advertising it will not do so anywhere.

24/ Schmidt’s announcement oughtn’t have caught Europe+ completely flatfooted; succession had to be discussed, at least within foreign ministries.

25/ But this moment demands rapid strategic evolution for Europe+ members in a situation where they are relatively more empowered than elsewhere. They need to demonstrate that they can rise to the occasion.

The post Following High Rep Schmidt’s announced departure, it’s not a time for Europe+ to be timid in BiH appeared first on Democratization Policy Council.

While the global arena has witnessed a solid nine months of relentless, flamboyant norm-busting by the second Trump administration, this dynamic seemed to largely leave previously established American topline policies intact. Of course, the wanton destruction of USAID early in the administration delivered a deep blow in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the rest of the Western Balkans, and – with devastating effect – globally. The wider Trump family engaged in deals, such as deeply controversial developments in Serbia and Albania. And US embassies became far less vocal and interactive with their erstwhile closest partners, including the EU – which has set the pace for the West through its enlargement policy for two decades. But the fundamentals of Washington’s policies pertaining to BiH and the region remained largely consistent, including the sanctions regime against the Republika Srpska (RS) separatist leader – and now convicted criminal and former RS President – Milorad Dodik and a wide circle of his family, associates, party, and connected businesses……

Read the full blog at BiEPAG here.

The post Where to for EU Enlargement in the Age of Reaction? The View from Sarajevo appeared first on Democratization Policy Council.

As the new US National Security Strategy highlights Washington’s pivot away from a rules-based democratic global order, the EU should focus hard on the one region where it can exert the most leverage – the Western Balkans.

Read more at Balkan Insight here.

The post US Foreign Policy Reorientation Means EU Must Step Up Balkan Role appeared first on Democratization Policy Council.

Ahead of the 30th anniversary of the Dayton peace agreement that ended the 1992-95 war, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are the most dissatisfied in the Western Balkans with the way they are being governed, an opinion survey highlighted.

Read more at Balkan Insight here.

The post Bosnians ‘Most Dissatisfied in the Balkans’ with their Politics – Is Brussels Listening? appeared first on Democratization Policy Council.

Facing a ban from holding office and desperate to cling to power, Milorad Dodik must be prevented from stepping up his dangerous threats of Serb secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Read more at Balkan Insight here.

The post After the Bosnian Court Finds Milorad Dodik Guilty, What Next? appeared first on Democratization Policy Council.

Joe Biden’s outgoing administration has less than a week to ensure its latest sanctions on Balkan leaders are not only transformative, but difficult for the incoming Donald Trump government to undo.

Read more at Balkan Insight here.

The post Time is Running Short for New US Sanctions in Balkans to Work appeared first on Democratization Policy Council.